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This study examines the challenges to European law posed by third-country access to data held 
by private companies for purposes of law-enforcement investigations in criminal proceedings. 
The proliferation of electronic communications is putting cloud-computing companies under 
severe strain from multiple demands from the authorities to acquire access to such data. 
A key challenge for the EU emerges when third-country authorities request access to data held 
by private companies under EU jurisdiction outside pre-established channels of cooperation, in 
particular outside Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) treaties. The EU concluded an MLA agreement 
with the United States in 2003, which sets out the rules and procedures for lawful and legitimate 
access to evidence. A key distinguishing feature of the MLA-led process is that any request for 
access to data is ‘mediated’ by or requires the consent of the state authority to whom the request 
is submitted as well as scrutiny by an independent judicial authority.
Special focus is given in this study to the practical issues emerging in EU-US relations covering 
mutual legal assistance and evidence-gathering for law enforcement purposes in criminal 
proceedings. The fundamental question guiding this enquiry is: How best to ensure that the rule 
of law and trust-based methods are respected in these proceedings?
In conducting this study, the authors carried out a detailed survey of the main EU legal instruments 
and their standards, underlining their direct relevance for assessing the lawfulness and legitimacy 
of access to data. They then outline three possible scenarios for the future and put forward a set 
of policy recommendations for addressing these challenges. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
his study examines the challenges posed to European law by third-
country access to data held by private companies for the purposes of 
law enforcement. It pays particular attention to the implications for 
rule of law and fundamental rights of foreign authorities’ direct access to 
electronic information falling outside pre-established channels of 
supranational cooperation. A special focus is given to EU-US relations and 
the practical issues emerging in transatlantic relations covering mutual legal 
assistance and evidence gathering for law enforcement purposes in criminal 
proceedings.  
Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) treaties constitute the classical instrument 
allowing for foreign law-enforcement cooperation and assistance in the 
gathering of evidence in ongoing criminal investigations. A case in point is 
the EU-US MLA Agreement concluded in 2003. The proliferation and 
increasing uses of electronic communications has led to the emergence of 
law enforcement practices and voices attempting to have access outside 
MLA channels of cooperation to data controlled by private companies falling 
under EU jurisdiction. 
The study assesses the main difficulties posed by unmediated third-country 
access from the perspective of European law. It argues that foreign access 
to data falling outside existing MLA processes only increases legal 
uncertainty and mistrust in transatlantic and private sector-public 
authorities’ relations, as well as the public at large. 
The analysis provides a detailed survey of the main EU legal instruments 
with direct relevance when assessing the lawfulness and legitimacy of 
access to data for law enforcement purposes. The EU exercises extensive 
legal competence over domains related to privacy, criminal justice and 
cybercrime, and has developed a large body of law providing common 
supranational rule-of-law standards applicable to a large majority of 
Member States. 
The study then moves into an assessment of the main challenges posed by 
unmediated third-country access to electronic data against these EU legal 
standards. Third-country access to data outside established legal channels 
of mediated assistance (MLA) poses four legal and rule-of-law challenges: 
First, the jurisdiction challenge: An inherent tension exists between 
unmediated third-country access to data and the state-based territorial 
concept of jurisdiction. In criminal justice systems, the notion of jurisdiction 
requires the conclusion of MLAs to handle conflicts of law. Third-country 
access to data unlawfully bypasses existing legally-binding channels, 
resulting in legal insecurity and mistrust. The European concept of 
jurisdiction in the field of human rights differs also from that in the US. For 
all EU Member States the final word on their legal obligations is not in their 
T
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constitutions. They must comply with the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and the supranational set of rule of law and fundamental 
rights provisions in the EU legal system. 
Second, the lawfulness and ‘forum-shopping’ challenge: These 
practices and current discussions in international and regional fora fail to 
pass the lawfulness test in EU law. Some security actors are using regional 
venues (‘forum shopping’) to agree on new rules that would put at risk EU 
rule-of-law standards by legalising unilateral law-enforcement access by 
third countries to data held by private-sector actors.  
Discussions such as those in the Council of Europe (CoE) on cybercrime and 
transborder access to electronic data open serious questions from the 
perspective of EU law. The US and EU Member States are clearly committed 
to the rules laid down in the MLA agreement. EU Member States are now 
also committed to the system of access to evidence in criminal proceedings 
provided by instruments such as the so-called ‘European Investigation 
Order’ (EIO), which also limit their competences in foreign affairs in these 
matters. The external action of the EU and of Member States must be 
therefore consistent and compatible with this framework. Member States’ 
commitments in the Council of Europe context must also be compatible with 
EU law. 
Third, the challenge of alleged inefficiency: Arguments alleging that 
MLA agreement models are inefficient are not substantiated by the available 
evidence or statistics on their uses and practical operability. While there 
exist certain obstacles affecting their practical implementation, this study 
argues that they can be overcome through a combined approach focused 
on bilateral case consultations, day-to-day contacts, stronger political 
commitments, more effective use of existing tools and sound financial, 
technological and human resources investments in their implementation. 
Fourth, the privacy and data protection challenge: Third-country 
access to data outside MLA agreements is contrary to EU data protection 
acquis. There are major dissimilarities between the EU and the US as 
regards data protection, not least the lack of effective judicial protection 
provided to EU citizens in US territory for privacy violations. This makes it 
difficult for EU institutions and Member States to ensure the safeguarding 
of EU fundamental rights and the benchmarks developed by the 
Luxembourg Court of Justice of the European Union in the 2014 Digital 
Rights Ireland ruling in transatlantic operating frameworks of cooperation 
in the domains of law enforcement and criminal justice. 
Any future steps and developments should be therefore be closely tied to 
the rule of law and mediated access to data models in the scope of MLA 
processes and in conformity with EU law instruments and standards. The 
study then outlines three scenarios or options and puts forward a set of 
policy recommendations aimed at ensuring the rule of law and trust-based 
ways of moving forward on these issues. These are summarised below. 
OPTION 1: Enhancing the MLA Agreement Model. This option would 
focus on ways to enhance existing legal provisions and procedures 
envisaged in the EU-US MLA framework within the current framework and 
without needing any general or specific legislative reform. Under this 
scenario the following specific policy recommendations are put forward: 
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 The EU should devise an independent evaluation/tracking system on 
the operability of the EU-US MLA Agreement. This should include 
statistical coverage of quantitative uses of MLA requests under the 
agreement. An EU-US Guide for Practitioners on the Use and 
Procedures within the EU-US MLA Agreement should be adopted. The 
Guide would provide ‘promising practices’ to relevant national 
authorities for overcoming practical obstacles and ensuring some 
streamlining of procedures. 
 Eurojust could further facilitate cooperation between EU Member 
States and the US authorities in the execution of MLA requests, under 
close democratic and judicial scrutiny and that of relevant EU data 
protection bodies. 
 Issues related to data protection, criminal justice and cybercrime now 
fall under EU competence. Any international negotiations covering 
these matters fall under exclusive EU external competence. The 
Commission is now in the driver’s seat together with the European 
Parliament. The Commission and Parliament should also express 
concerns and centralise any further discussion on the EU’s position 
regarding transborder access to data in the Council of Europe 
Cybercrime Committee. 
 Key pre-conditions for further transatlantic cooperation should be the 
conclusion of the EU-US umbrella data protection agreement, the 
grading of EU citizens’ effective judicial protection in the US and a 
swift EU inter-institutional consensus on the new data protection 
package. 
OPTION 2: Improving the MLA Agreement Model. Under this scenario 
the EU-US MLA Agreement would be revised through legislative reform. The 
latter would be centred on bringing the agreement frameworks more in line 
with the EU-post Lisbon Treaty setting of legal norms and standards.  
A starting point on such a potential revision should be the benchmarks laid 
down in the EU Directive on a European Investigation Order (EIO). These 
benchmarks provide clear safeguards on the basis of domestic and 
constitutional provisions in the executing and issuing Member State, 
proportionality test and fundamental rights exceptions, in addition to the 
judicialisation of MLA. Any legislative reform should not result in lowering 
existing rule-of-law standards and guarantees. The following 
recommendations are suggested under this option: 
 The EU-US MLA model could be revised and amended in light of the 
EU post-Lisbon Treaty framework of legal standards and benchmarks 
in the domains of criminal justice and data protection. The EIO could 
be used as the minimum criteria or red lines for any future revision 
of the EU-US MLA framework. Eurojust should not become here a 
‘mediator’ allowing for a model of hybrid access to electronic data.  
 The EU should call for the consolidation and codification of existing 
EU rules and instruments dealing with judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. This could lead to the adoption of a Common Corpus of 
European Criminal Law. 
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OPTION 3: Towards a Transatlantic Investigation Order. A third and 
long-term potential scenario would be the development of a common justice 
area across the Atlantic. Under this scenario, a recommendation is made to 
explore the future adoption of a Transatlantic Investigation Order (TIO) 
system which would speed and make more efficient judicial cooperation 
between the US and the EU. Such a system should start from rebuilding 
mutual trust on safeguarding rule of law and fundamental rights in US-EU 
security cooperation. 
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SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION 
hird-country law enforcement access to electronic data is an issue of 
increasing relevance and concern in the European Union (EU). 
Unilateral access by foreign law enforcement authorities to individuals’ 
data held by private companies creates a number of dilemmas and legal 
uncertainties when falling outside existing legal channels of transnational 
judicial cooperation.  
The background of these issues is marked both by the large scale in the 
profusion of data about individuals produced and processed by private 
companies, and by the disruption of trust in transatlantic relations heralded 
by the Snowden revelations on large-scale electronic surveillance by the US.  
The 2013 ‘Snowden revelations’ brought to public attention the massive 
quantities of data and electronic communications that are constantly 
collected and generated by the most common of daily activities of citizens, 
and the fact that these could potentially be reached and accessed by 
authorities from a third country. Among the uncovered practices of large-
scale mass surveillance supported by US authorities, a number of 
surveillance programmes stood out, such as PRISM, a programme allowing 
the US National Security Agency (NSA) to collect data about electronic 
communications from major companies operating globally.1 
This study does not directly cover questions related to secret security-
related large-scale surveillance, national security and intelligence 
communities’ activities or practices. It focuses on the legal issues and 
rule-of-law challenges raised by foreign authorities’ access to 
electronic data for law enforcement purposes in questions related to 
mutual legal assistance and evidence gathering in criminal proceedings.  
The study assesses the implications of US authorities’ access to electronic 
data under EU jurisdiction on privacy, the rights of the defence in criminal 
proceedings and more generally the rule of law in European Union law. 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty five years ago, the EU has 
been recognised as having shared competence and has developed a solid 
body of Union law covering data protection, criminal justice and police/law 
enforcement cooperation and cybercrime. These provide common 
European rules and normative standards of particular relevance when 
assessing the challenges posed by unmediated access by foreign authorities 
of data held by private sector under the EU’s jurisdiction.  
                                                   
1  For an in-depth study on the challenges raised by large-scale electronic 
surveillance programmes to democratic rule of law refer to D. Bigo et al. (2013), 
“Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its compatibility with 
EU Law”, CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe Series, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels.  
T
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Among these standards stand chiefly the fundamental human rights of 
privacy and data protection, enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. The evolving EU data protection acquis places the 
consent of the data subject2 to access or disclosure of her/his personal data 
as one of the cornerstones of EU data protection law. ‘Consent’ constitutes 
a key ground for the legitimacy and lawfulness of states’ interference with 
the fundamental human right of privacy. In a law enforcement and criminal 
justice context, this ‘consent’ assumes different shapes and translates into 
the mediation of an independent authority or court of law to allow for access 
and processing of individuals’ data.  
Transatlantic law enforcement access to data poses several dilemmas from 
an EU law viewpoint. There are important discrepancies between the EU 
and US legal systems in relation to personal data protection, but also as 
regards criminal law traditions and procedures. A key source of 
disagreement between the US and the EU when assessing the legality of 
access to data and interference with privacy relates to the question: Who 
can give consent to access and share data?  
Any legal evaluation on whether US authorities can have access or request 
data directly from private companies does not find its answer in privacy or 
data protection law, but rather in Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) 
agreements. Indeed, the differences in laws between the EU and US legal 
systems have been addressed through the conclusion of a MLA Agreement 
in 2003.  
An MLA represents the classical treaty-based mechanism allowing for 
foreign law enforcement cooperation and assistance in ongoing criminal 
investigations and proceedings, while respecting the notions of jurisdiction 
and national sovereignty in criminal justice matters. It constitutes the most 
important legally-binding tool that provides the rules through which third-
country authorities can lawfully issue requests for assistance in relation to 
the gathering of evidence from foreign jurisdictions.  
Two basic steps apply in how MLAs operate, which are key at times of 
answering the question of ‘who’ can give consent to accessing electronic 
data: First, the receipt and assessment of the request for access will be 
delivered by a designated central authority of the requested state; and 
second, an independent judicial authority will validate or give consent to 
the legality for allowing access and processing of the data. 
The proliferation and increasing use of electronic information has led to the 
emergence of voices calling for the fastening and legalisation of third-
country access to data held by private companies outside MLA channels. A 
central argument used by those advocating for these practices is that the 
MLA model does not work effectively in practice, because of obstacles and 
barriers which make them too slow and burdensome.  
Yet bypassing existing legal channels of judicial and law 
enforcement cooperation would pose profound rule-of-law 
challenges. The US and EU Member States are clearly committed to the 
                                                   
2 Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights states, “[S]uch data must be 
processed fairly for specific purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person 
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law”. 
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rules laid down in the MLA agreement. EU Member States are now also 
committed to the system of access to evidence in criminal proceedings 
provided by the so-called European Investigation Order (EIO), which limits 
their foreign affairs competences in these matters. The external action of 
the EU and of Member States must be therefore consistent and compatible 
with this framework. Member States’ commitments in the Council of Europe 
context must also be compatible with EU law.  
Moreover, claims alluding to the inefficiency of MLA procedures call for a 
cautious examination on the basis of existing evidence. Are these 
arguments based on objective data? What are the main current obstacles 
characterising the operability and implementation of MLA channels for 
mediated access to data in foreign jurisdictions, and what may be the actual 
issues behind them?  
This study focuses on access to data held by private companies, and more 
specifically on transatlantic access to data held by companies providing 
their services in the EU and henceforth falling under European jurisdiction. 
These circumstances are of utmost relevance in practice. Data processed 
and held by companies has grown exponentially in recent decades, and the 
interest of law enforcement authorities in accessing it has increased 
proportionally.  
Companies are facing increasing demands by governments and law 
enforcement authorities to have access to electronic individuals’ data under 
their control. These practices are blurring the ‘rules of the game’ and 
bring about legal uncertainty for private companies and all the 
relevant actors involved, which are often confronted with 
competing demands from different national governments 
authorities. Companies are consequently confronted with increasing 
mistrust from individuals (and potential customers), courts and 
supranational institutions on the adequacy of privacy and due process in a 
context of large-scale pre-emptive surveillance.  
This study aims at identifying and assessing the main issues and difficulties 
that the proliferation and potential legalisation of third-country access to 
data outside MLA channels triggers from the perspective EU law. It is argued 
that unmediated models of foreign authorities’ access to electronic data 
controlled by private companies should be avoided as they pose profound 
fundamental challenges to fundamental rights and rule of law. EU law as it 
stands simply does not allow the direct interaction between US authorities 
(or any other third country for the same matter) and private companies. 
While claims for speed and rapidity can be understood from a law-
enforcement perspective, these may jeopardise the effective delivery of 
justice, rule of law and the proper safeguarding of privacy and the rights of 
defence. Remote access to data will only increase mistrust in transatlantic 
relations and private sector-public institution relations as well as by 
individuals.  
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The analysis has been structured into five main sections. 3  After this 
introductory section, Section 2 outlines the ways in which foreign 
authorities access to data can be framed by different models, and presents 
existing instruments relevant in a transatlantic context. Section 3 describes 
the applicable EU legal standards in a post-Lisbon Treaty landscape. Section 
4 identifies the key legal and rule-of-law challenges raised by non-MLA 
models of access to data advanced in section 2. Finally, Section 5 discusses 
possible upcoming steps or scenarios, and puts forward a set of 
recommendations to European institutions. 
                                                   
3 The research presented has been based on an assessment of key legal and policy 
documents, as well as relevant literature. This has been combined with semi-
structured interviews with key actors, practitioners and policy-makers. Interviews 
were conducted in Brussels, Washington, D.C., and The Hague during the spring 
and summer of 2015. Preliminary findings were discussed at a closed-doors expert 
meeting held in March 2015 at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 
Brussels. 
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SECTION 2. MODELS OF THIRD-COUNTRY ACCESS 
TO DATA 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 There are three main models of third-country access to data: 
first, mediated access schemes (corresponding with Mutual Legal 
Assistance agreements); second, unmediated access to data practices 
or remote access claims; and third, hybrid access to data models with 
a third party as non-judicially independent mediator. The two last 
models stand in a difficult relationship with the rule of law. 
 The exact ways in which mediated access models work in 
practice often depends on the specific features characterising the 
country’s domestic legal and judicial system (adversarial or non-
adversarial). Under mediated models two moments are of importance: 
First, the receipt and assessment of the request for access by a 
designated central authority of the requested state; and second, the 
involvement of an independent judicial authority in validating access 
and processing of the data.  
 For the purposes of EU law, ‘competent national law enforcement 
authority’ usually means the police authorities, yet important variations 
exist across EU Member States. This concept does not include 
intelligence services. A court for the purposes of EU law must be 
characterised by its independence, impartiality and focus on settling 
the rule of law, which all together enable delivering effective remedies. 
 There is a fundamental difference between data or information, 
and evidence. For data to be considered “evidence” in criminal justice 
procedures, its access, processing and use in criminal proceedings will 
need to pass a legality test by an independent judicial authority. 
 The EU has developed so-called ‘hybrid models’ of access to data 
through the involvement of EU agencies (e.g. Europol). These models 
lack a proper oversight system by an independent judicial authority. 
They are affected by accountability and transparency deficits. 
Foreign authorities’ access to data may take place in different ways and 
forms. This section presents the three main models of transnational 
access to data, and considers their current and potential relevance for the 
EU. These three basic different patterns or ‘models’ can be broadly 
identified, as described below. 
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First, data-accessing can occur in accordance with mediated access 
schemes, whereby an authority in the requesting state wishing to obtain 
access to data under the jurisdiction of another state contacts a designated 
central authority of that country with recognised competence to order 
access and data transfers from private companies (section 2.1 below). 
Access to data is supervised by the central authority and an independent 
court or tribunal of the requested country. This model corresponds to the 
system laid down in MLA agreements.  
A second model relates to unmediated access practices or remote 
third-country access systems, whereby an authority in the requesting 
foreign country communicates its demands directly to the private company 
holding or controlling the data. This is so even if the company’s decision to 
disclose the data can be considered to fall under another jurisdiction and 
access to the data would entail legal responsibility there (section 2.2). This 
model lacks consent by the requested state and any mediation by 
independent judicial authority. 
A third possibility is a model requiring the authority of the requesting 
country to transmit its request not to an authority in the requested 
jurisdiction but which has an ad hoc authority, not corresponding with a 
specific state. This authority shall thus act as a special, sui generis and non-
judicially independent ‘mediator’. This kind of ‘hybrid access to data’ 
model raises similar challenges due to the lack of judicial supervision and 
accountability of the decision allowing for access to information (section 
2.3). 
2.1. Mediated Access Model 
Traditionally, EU Member States have privileged the model of mediated 
access to authorise the obtaining of data for law enforcement purposes in 
a transnational context or when cooperating with third countries. This 
paradigm is behind the adoption of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, and 
the most relevant example epitomising this approach in the EU is the EU-
US Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance (hereinafter EU-US MLA). 
The EU-US MLA was signed in 2003, together with a parallel transatlantic 
agreement on extradition. 4  They were concluded in a complex legal 
landscape, predating the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, where the 
former EU Treaties did not confer expressly to the EU legal personality and 
where the Union still had limited competences over police and criminal 
justice cooperation affairs.5 As a result, the entry into force of the EU-US 
MLA had to follow the exchange of instruments by the parties indicating 
                                                   
4 Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the United States of 
America, OJ L181, 19 July 2003, p. 27; Agreement on mutual legal assistance 
between the European Union and the United States of America, OJ L181, 19 July 
2003, p. 34. See also the Council Decision, on the basis of Articles 24 and 38 TEU, 
concerning the signature of these agreements: OJ L181, 19 July 2003, p. 25. 
5 They were as a matter of fact the first international agreements negotiated by 
the EU under its ‘Third Pillar’. For details, see: V. Mitsilegas (2003), “The New EU-
US Co-operation on Extradition, Mutual Legal Assistance and the Exchange of Police 
Data”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8, pp. 515-536. 
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that they had completed their internal procedures for this purpose. 6 
Domestic procedures were only completed in 2009,7 and the agreements 
entered into force only on 1 February 2010. 
Under this model there are two decisive moments in the ‘requested 
State’ receiving an MLAT request: The first corresponds to the receipt 
of the request by the designated central authority, which is in charge 
of examining the MLA request against existing domestic legal requirements 
and standards; and the second relates to the transmission of that 
request from the central designated authority to the prosecutor’s 
office to obtain a court order. The issuing of a court order is required for 
the prosecutor to obtain the requested electronic data lawfully. Once issued, 
the data will be examined against the MLA request, and will then be 
transmitted to the requesting State via the designated MLA channels.  
The ways in which the ‘mediated access’ model work in practice or the 
procedures for sending/receiving MLA requests may differ depending on the 
specific legal tradition of the country at hand. Differences may exist, for 
instance, when looking at adversarial and non-adversarial (often referred 
to also as ‘inquisitorial’) systems, which usually operate in civil law 
traditions. These traditions determine the exact ways and procedures 
through which criminal justice investigations and cases are to be conducted 
in different legal systems.8 In adversarial systems such as the US, how the 
MLAT procedure works in practice has been described as follows:9 
Supervising the execution of incoming MLATs—requests for 
assistance from foreign jurisdictions—requires direct federal district 
court oversight and involvement. In contrast, the courts play no part 
in initiating or processing outgoing MLAT requests. That is the 
province of the executive branch. Requests from abroad (“incoming 
requests”) for legal assistance are directed to a country’s designated 
“central authority”, usually the Department (or Ministry) of Justice. 
The central authority, in turn, transmits the MLAT or letter rogatory-
related communication to the appropriate court or government 
entity. When a federal prosecutor appears before a U.S. district court 
requesting assistance on behalf of a foreign state or provides notice 
                                                   
6 Article 22(1) of the Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement. This provision triggered 
Article 24(5) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), allowing Member States to 
indicate that they need to follow internal constitutional procedures. 
7 Council Decision 2009/820/CFSP on the conclusion on behalf of the European 
Union of the Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the United 
States of America and the Agreement on mutual legal assistance between the 
European Union and the United States of America, OJ L291, 7.11.2009, p. 40. 
8 One of the main differences between the adversarial/common law and non-
adversarial (inquisitorial) systems is the role of the judge. In adversarial/common 
law, the judge does not take up the role of investigating the case her/himself, but 
rather plays a role of neutral mediator between the prosecutor and the defence. 
The most persuasive and effective adversary convincing the judge will win the case. 
In a non-adversarial or inquisitorial system, the judge takes up an investigative 
role in examining the facts of a given case. 
9  See http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/mlat-lr-guide-funk-fjc-
2014.pdf/$file/ 
mlat-lr-guide-funk-fjc-2014.pdf. 
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that the U.S. government will seek assistance from a foreign state, 
the prosecutor acts at the direction of the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Office of International Affairs (OIA). OIA is the United 
States’ central authority and de facto functional hub for all outgoing 
and incoming requests for transnational investigation and litigation 
assistance. 
Furthermore, it is important to be circumspect regarding the expression 
‘law enforcement access to data’, as it may be deceiving when trying to 
understand mediated access models. The answer to the question of ‘who’ 
is a ‘competent law enforcement authority’ remains by and large 
disputed. It is generally intertwined with specific national legal traditions. 
This is in turn problematic from the perspective of legal certainty and 
safeguarding EU law standards when assessing the lawfulness of access to 
data for law enforcement and criminal justice purposes.  
The EU is here not an exception. By and large, EU Member States have 
designated national police authorities and services ‘competent national 
law enforcement authorities’. This corresponds with Article 2 of the 
Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the 
exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement 
authorities of the Member States of the European Union, which states that 
a “‘competent law enforcement authority’ [is] a national police, customs or 
other authority that is authorised by national law to detect, prevent and 
investigate offences or criminal activities and to exercise authority and take 
coercive measures in the context of such activities”. However, important 
variations exist in practice.10 Moreover, this provision emphasises that 
those agencies covering “national security issues”, chiefly intelligence 
services, are not covered by this concept. 
In the scope of EU criminal justice law, the definition of ‘judicial 
authority’ would come from the text of the Directive on the European 
Investigation Order (EIO) (see section 3.3 below for a detailed analysis).11 
The terms “court” or “tribunal” have not been provided in the Treaties. The 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held that the terms have 
autonomous and self-standing meanings in the context of mutual 
                                                   
10  According to the Guidelines on the application of this Framework Decision 
published by the Council in 2009, the differentiation characterising the designation 
of authorities has been confirmed. A substantial majority of EU Member States have 
selected police authorities and services. That notwithstanding, four Member States 
have included prosecutors’ offices (e.g. Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and 
Hungary). Others have designated military/defence authorities (e.g. Estonia, 
France, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania). Financial/Tax authorities have 
been designated in Germany, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Sweden and 
the UK. Several Member States have nominated border and customs authorities 
(e.g. Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Sweden and 
the UK). Finally, in a few cases Member States have designated ministries or special 
directorates in ministries (e.g. Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg or 
Romania). Council of the EU, Guidelines on the Implementation of Council 
Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the 
exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of 
the Member States of the European Union, 8083/09, 7 April 2009, Brussels. 
11  Directive 2014/41 regarding the European Investigation Order in Criminal 
Matters, OJ L 130, 1.5.2014. 
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recognition in criminal matters in EU law.12 For a body to be considered 
a court with jurisdiction for the purposes of EU law a number of criteria 
need to be met. These include whether it applies the rule of law and is 
independent and impartial, with no other interest than applying the rule of 
law. 13  Therefore, for the purposes of this study, every time “law 
enforcement access” is used, reference is made to access to data by 
authorities unmediated access models, and which therefore lack 
independence from the executive of the country concerned or their interests 
are not impartial for applying the rule of law.  
2.2. Unmediated Access Model 
This model corresponds with access by third-country authorities to data 
falling under EU jurisdiction without going through the competent authority 
that could authorise the access in the relevant EU Member State under the 
MLA channels of cooperation. A key distinguishing feature of this model is 
the lack of consent by the requested stated and the non-
intervention by an independent authority in the requested EU state 
validating the lawfulness of accessing and processing data. Foreign 
authorities’ deliver a data request or legal order directly to private 
companies rather than using existing MLAT processes. 
Under this model, a third country actually asserts the authority under its 
own national law to access electronic data falling under the scope of EU 
laws – data which might or might not be stored in EU territory, but which 
still remains under Union’s jurisdiction. This scheme can generate multiple 
conflicts of law when, in spite of the requesting country’s perception, the 
transfer of data would trigger legal consequences or liabilities in the affected 
country for the requested private company. As illustrated in section 4 of 
this study, this model poses far-reaching legal and rule-of-law 
challenges from the perspective of EU law. 
                                                   
12  For more information on the principle of mutual recognition see 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/recognition-decision/index_en.htm. 
13 Refer to P. Aalto et al. (2014), “Article 47 – Right to an Effective Remedy and to 
a Fair Trial”, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner and A. Ward (eds), The EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 1208. See for 
instance Case C-54/96 Dorsch and Case C-506/04 Wilson of 19 September 2006. 
In the latter judgment the CJEU clarified that the notion of independence is a 
constitutive element of the act of adjudication and differentiated two main 
dimensions: first, that the body is free from external intervention or pressure; 
second, that it is impartial, with no other interest than applying the rule of law. 
See paragraph 51 of the judgment which states, “The first aspect, which is 
external, presumes that the body is protected against external intervention or 
pressure liable to jeopardise the independent judgment of its members as regards 
proceedings before them. That essential freedom from such external factors 
requires certain guarantees sufficient to protect the person of those who have the 
task of adjudicating in a dispute, such as guarantees against removal from office”. 
And paragraph 52 which reads, “The second aspect, which is internal, is linked to 
impartiality and seeks to ensure a level playing field for the parties to the 
proceedings and their respective interests with regard to the subject-matter of 
those proceedings. That aspect requires objectivity and the absence of any interest 
in the outcome of the proceedings apart from the strict application of the rule of 
law.” 
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The use of this model brings in sharp relief the need to distinguish between 
what is “data” and what constitutes “evidence” before a court of law. 
Unmediated access models highlight the distinction between electronic 
data or e-information and “evidence” in criminal proceedings. Data 
or information cannot always be considered accurate, reliable and lawful 
evidence.14 While law enforcement may have access to large-scale data of 
individuals, some of which may be often qualified as “intelligence”, this does 
not mean that this kind of information will pass the lawfulness test for it to 
be accepted as evidence before an independent judge in a pending criminal 
case. The study therefore avoids using notions such as ‘electronic or cloud 
evidence’, as they are misleading of the material scope of the debate.  
Discussions in the context of the Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Convention 
on transborder access to data without going through existing mutual legal 
assistance channels have hinted towards the possible inscription of this 
unmediated model in future instruments which would amend the Budapest 
Convention (section 2.2.1). Furthermore, a practical case where the validity 
of this model is at stake is currently pending in the US, the Microsoft Search 
Warrant case (section 2.2.2).  
2.2.1. Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee 
Transnational law enforcement access to data has been the focus of 
particular attention in relation to the Council of Europe’s work on 
cybercrime. In this context, the key legal instrument is the Convention on 
Cybercrime of 23 November 2001, also known as the ‘Budapest 
Convention’.15 
The Convention on Cybercrime was the first international treaty specifically 
devoted to cybercrime and to synchronising national laws on these matters. 
Developed in 2001, it came into force in 2004. The Convention encourages 
international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of offenses 
such as illegal access and illegal interception of data and communications, 
data interference, system interference or misuse of devices. The 
Convention has not been ratified by all EU Member States. 16  The 
Convention has nevertheless been signed and ratified by a number 
of countries that are not Member States of the Council of Europe, 
including the US, Australia and Japan. 
                                                   
14 K. Roach (2010), “The Eroding Distinction Between Intelligence and Evidence in 
Terrorism Investigations”, in N. McGarrity, A. Lynch and G. Williams (eds), 
Counter-Terrorism and Beyond, London: Routledge, pp. 48-68. Roach argues, 
“[T]he creation of sweeping new terrorism offences after 9/11 has blurred the 
traditional distinctions between intelligence and evidence. Such new offences 
reflect an intelligence mind-set that focuses on threats, risk, associations and 
suspicion as opposed to an evidence or criminal law mind-set that focuses on acts, 
accomplices and guilt. One implication of the blurring of the distinction between 
intelligence and evidence is a convergence between the work of police forces and 
security intelligence agencies in terrorism investigations. This convergence is 
driven in part by the demands of prevention”. 
15 Retrievable from http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm. 
16 Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Poland and Sweden have signed but not ratified it. Some 
Member States of the Council of Europe, such as Russia, have not signed it. 
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The Convention on Cybercrime includes a provision on “trans-border access 
to stored computer data with consent or where publicly available” in Article 
32.b. In accordance with this Article, a party may 
without the authorisation of another Party, access or receive, 
through a computer system in its territory, stored computer data 
located in another Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and voluntary 
consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the 
data to the Party through that computer system.  
The provision tackles the issue of the possible access to data from a 
requesting country directly from a ‘person’ in the requested country without 
the authorisation of the latter, and hence outside existing MLA frameworks.  
The Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), 17  which aims at 
facilitating the effective use and implementation of the Convention, and 
particularly its Cloud Evidence Group, has opened a process aiming at 
amending this Article. The issue of transnational law enforcement access 
to data has also been given special relevance in the discussions of 
Cybercrime@Octopus, a Council of Europe project based on voluntary 
contributions aimed at assisting countries in implementation and 
strengthening data protection and rule-of-law safeguards.18  In 2013, a 
suggestion was made at an Octopus Conference to address the matter of 
cross-border access to personal data between States’ parties in a new 
Protocol or other binding international instrument.19  
The main idea of such a new Protocol would be to allow or ‘legalise’ an 
unmediated model of access to data, where remote access or data requests 
issued directly to private companies would be permissible without going 
through existing cooperation or MLA channels. The justification put forward 
for a revision has been that the increasing use of electronic and cloud-based 
data has made the work of law enforcement authorities more difficult and 
that existing MLA arrangements are inefficient.  
This initiative has created controversy in several EU instances in Brussels. 
The European Parliament has expressed serious concerns about the 
work carried out within the Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Convention 
Committee with a view to developing an additional protocol on the 
                                                   
17 See http://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/tcy. See also the Guidance Note 
that it developed on the use of Article 32 at 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommon 
SearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016802e726a.  
18  The project ensures the organisation of annual conferences, supports the 
Cybercrime Convention Committee, and provides advice and assistance to states 
parties. See 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/Cybercrime@O
ctopus/Cybercrime@Octopus_en.asp. 
19 The environment surrounding this initiative has been described as “a situation 
where cross-border access to personal data by national law-enforcement agencies 
is becoming effectively unregulated and close to arbitrary”. D. Korff (2014), “The 
Rule of Law on the Internet and in the Wider Digital World”, Issue Paper Published 
by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe. 
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interpretation of Article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime.20 As we will 
study in detail in section 4 below, the European Parliament has raised 
serious doubts related to questions of EU legal competence and 
compatibility of these regional debates with existing EU law standards. 
2.2.2. The Microsoft Search Warrant Case 
A case exemplifying the unmediated access model is currently pending 
before US courts, more concretely before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit.21 It was initiated in 2013 as US authorities sought access 
to data related to an email account held by the company Microsoft. 
In December 2013, the US government presented an affidavit establishing 
probable cause to believe that a Microsoft-based email account was being 
used for narcotics trafficking. The competent US magistrate judge issued a 
search warrant pursuant to the 1986 Stored Communications Act (SCA),22 
that is, an ‘SCA warrant’. It requested Microsoft to disclose all the contents 
of the email account. Microsoft, however, refused to disclose the requested 
records on the basis that the US court could not compel Microsoft to do so 
because the data were stored in a data centre in Dublin (Ireland). 
Microsoft then presented a motion before the judge to vacate the warrant, 
which was denied, as the judge stressed the warrant obliged Microsoft 
to produce the solicited data regardless of the location.23 The judge 
took the position that the request by the government was not a 
conventional warrant, but rather a ‘compelled disclosure’ or subpoena, and 
held that in any case it was not an extraterritorial assertion of US law.  
This ruling was challenged before the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, but the District Court’s Chief Judge confirmed the prior 
decision,24 maintaining that the U.S. Congress had intended the SCA to 
compel electronic communications providers to produce any information 
under their control, including information stored abroad. The chief judge 
thus entered an Order against Microsoft for the continuing refusal to comply 
with the warrant, but the company was allowed to appeal to the Second 
Circuit.25 
                                                   
20  European Parliament, Resolution of 10 December 2013 on unleashing the 
potential of cloud computing in Europe (2013/2063(INI)), Strasbourg, § 72. 
21 In “Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp.”, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
22 The SCA is part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Pub. L. 
No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986), and regulates law enforcement access to 
content communications when in the possession of a provider of an “electronic 
communications service” (ECS) or a “remote computing service” (RCS) to the 
public. 
23 “Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp.”, 15 F Supp. 3d 466, 472 (S.D.N.Y 2014). 
24 In “Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by 
Microsoft Corp.”, No 14-2985-CV, 2014 WL 4629624 (S.D.N.Y. 29 August 2014). 
25 Brief for Appellant at 2, Microsoft v. US, No. 14-2985-cv (2nd Cir. 2014). 
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Microsoft has contested the decision on the grounds that the records are 
stored in a data centre in foreign country, not owned by Microsoft but rather 
by the email user, and that the order entails a conflict of laws and the 
impermissible exercise of extraterritorial authority.26 The US government 
has argued that there is no conflict of laws, and that the US retains the 
authority to order an entity within its jurisdiction to repatriate records.27 
From this viewpoint, as claimed by the US government, Microsoft being a 
US-based company, it would enjoy ‘corporate citizenship’ to which are 
attached some responsibilities, including the duty to comply with a 
disclosure order issued by a US court.28 
An Amicus Curiae Brief presented by two Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs)29 in support of Microsoft argues that the company could 
be allowed to transfer the data through MLAT procedures, but not directly 
from Microsoft to US authorities.30 Ireland also submitted an Amicus Curiae, 
observing foreign courts should respect Irish sovereignty,31 and stating that 
it “would be pleased to consider, as expeditiously as possible, a request 
under the treaty, should one be made” under the Criminal Justice (Mutual 
Assistance) Act.32  
An Amicus Brief presented by Digital Rights Ireland Limited (DRI), Liberty 
and the Open Rights Group33  underlines that the EU MLAT must be 
regarded as ‘self-executing’ in US law, and thus to affect previous US 
law without requiring any further legislation. Stressing the mandatory need 
to follow the MLAT provisions, it notes that “[a]dopting the US position 
would allow the US government unilaterally to substitute US court 
compulsion for the balancing process represented by the MLAT information 
request procedures”.34 
The US government argues that using MLATs would not be effective, as the 
data could quickly be moved to a different country, and because mutual 
legal assistance procedures are lengthy and do not result in a prompt 
                                                   
26 Microsoft has been joined by nine amici curiae comprising two Members of the 
European Parliament, technology and media companies, trade associations and 
civil society, and representatives from the academic community.  
27 In the view of the US government, “the power of compelled disclosure reaches 
records stored abroad so long as there is personal jurisdiction over the custodian 
and the custodian has control over the records”. Case 14-2985, Document 212, 9 
March 2015, p. 9. 
28 Ibid., p. 57. 
29 Jan Philipp Albrecht and Marju Lauristin. 
30 Amicus Curiae Albrecht, Document 148, 19 December 2014, p. 9. 
31 Brief of Amicus Curiae Ireland, Document 164, 23 December 2014, p. 3. 
32  Brief of Amicus Curiae Ireland, p. 4. The Act is available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2008/en/act/pub/0007/index.html.  
33 Amicus Brief Digital Rights Ireland Limited, Liberty and the Open Rights Group, 
Document 101, 15 December 2014, pp. 18-20. 
34 Amicus Brief Digital Rights Ireland Limited, Liberty and the Open Rights Group, 
Document 101, 15 December 2014, p. 25. 
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disclosure of records.35 The validity of this argument is contested in the DRI 
and others’ Amicus Brief, advancing that mutual legal assistance between 
the US and Ireland is believed to function efficiently, and stressing that 
“European law does not block the disclosure of information to foreign law 
enforcement authorities so long as there are sufficient protections of 
individual rights within the mechanism for such disclosure”.36  
2.3. Hybrid Access Models 
The two previously described access models do not exhaust all existing 
relevant scenarios or frameworks of access and exchange of data in EU-US 
relations. The EU has in some circumstances searched for ‘alternative 
systems’ to configure paths for granting access to data to law 
enforcement authorities across the Atlantic. A case in point has been 
an EU-US Agreement on the exchange of financial information called the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). 
In 2006 the media disclosed that for several years US authorities had been 
accessing massive amounts of personal data related to European financial 
transactions by obtaining the information directly from a private company, 
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), 
based in Belgium.37 The situation was addressed with the signature of an 
EU-US agreement under which the EU allows for the transfer of European 
financial data for its use in the context of the U.S. Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program (TFTP). After the European Parliament gave its consent to the 
agreement, the agreement between the EU and the US on the processing 
and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the EU to the US for the 
purposes of the TFTP came into force in August 2010.38  
The TFTP allows for the transfer to the U.S. Treasury Department of data 
stored in the territory of the EU for the purpose of the prevention, 
investigation, detection, or prosecution of terrorism or terrorist financing. 
The Agreement grants a special role to the EU’s law enforcement agency, 
Europol (The European Police Office) in The Hague. Europol is 
responsible for verifying that the requests emanating from the US 
meet the requirements described in the Agreement. This includes 
notably terms of clearly identifying the requested data, substantiating their 
necessity, and being as narrow as possible.39 Once this verification has 
taken place, the data request also becomes legally binding under EU law. 
                                                   
35 Case 14-2985, Document 212, pp. 51-52. 
36 Amicus Brief Digital Rights Ireland Limited, Liberty and the Open Rights Group, 
Document 101, 12.15.2014, pp. 13-14. 
37 See G. González Fuster, P. De Hert and S. Gutwirth (2008), “SWIFT and the 
vulnerability of transatlantic data transfers”, International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 191-202. See also A. Amicelle (2011), 
“The Great (Data) Bank Robbery: Terrorist Finance Tracking Program and the 
‘SWIFT Affair’”, Research Question 36, CERI, Sciences-Po, Paris. 
38 OJ L 195/5 of 27.7.2010. 
39 See Article 4(4) of the EU-US TFTP Agreement. 
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The designated provider must then provide the data directly to the U.S. 
Treasury Department.40 
The EU-US TFTP Agreement came into force in August 2010. Its 
implementation is subject to periodic reviews by a Joint Supervisory Body 
(JSB), composed of representatives of national data protection authorities. 
The first report of the Joint Supervisory Body was particularly critical about 
its implementation.41 More globally, it has been argued that the scrutiny 
role granted to Europol in the EU-US TFTP Agreement raises legal basis 
concerns, as well as effectiveness and human rights issues.42 
In 2013, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding resolution calling 
for the EU to suspend its TFTP agreement with the US in response to the 
revelations in the press about the access to SWIFT data by the U.S. National 
Security Agency.43 The Resolution noted that a majority of the European 
Parliament had given its consent to the TFTP Agreement solely on account 
of a strong protection afforded with a view to safeguarding EU citizens’ 
privacy and personal data protection rights, but that, as indicated by the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, procedures in place for exercising 
the right of access may not be adequate and in practice it may not be 
possible to exercise the right to rectification, erasure and blocking.44 
As it is further argued below, this model is equally problematic from the 
standpoint of EU legal standards. A key weakness with the role of Europol 
in the TFTP is the lack of proper oversight and independent scrutiny of 
decisions. The obstacles as regards the transparency and 
accountability of Europol’s role have even been experienced by the 
European Ombudsman, which has recently been refused public access to a 
report of Europol’s Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) on the implementation of 
the EU-US TFTP. 45  The challenge of this model remains the lack of 
independent judicial oversight of decisions taken for access to and transfers 
of financial data. 
                                                   
40 See Article 4(6) of the EU-US TFTP Agreement. 
41  EUROPOL Joint Supervisory Body, Report on the inspection of EUROPOL’s 
implementation of the TFTP agreement, conducted in November 2010, JSB 
EUROPOL inspection report 11-07, 1 March 2011, Brussels. On controversies 
surrounding this agreement, see more generally: Didier Bigo et al. (2011), 
“Towards a New EU Legal Framework for Data Protection and Privacy: Challenges, 
Principles and the Role of the European Parliament” (Policy Department C on 
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs of the Directorate General for Internal 
Policies of the European Parliament), especially pp. 74-78. 
42 V. Mitsilegas (2014), “Transatlantic counterterrorism cooperation and European 
values: The elusive quest for coherence”, in E. Fahey and D. Curtin (eds), A 
Transatlantic Community of Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 289-
315. 
43 European Parliament, Resolution of 23 October 2013 on the suspension of the 
TFTP agreement as a result of US National Security Agency surveillance, 
P7_TA(2013)0449. 
44 Ibid., paragraphs D and F. 
45  Refer to 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/correspondence.faces/en/ 
59133/html.bookmark. 
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SECTION 3. APPLICABLE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 
AND STANDARDS 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The EU has exercised wide legal competences and adopted a 
large set of legal instruments providing common Union standards and 
benchmarks for assessing the legality of third-country access to data 
for law enforcement and criminal justice investigations. 
 The Treaty of Lisbon reinforced and expanded EU powers as well 
as democratic and judicial scrutiny in criminal justice and police 
cooperation domains. The legally binding nature of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights positions the fundamental rights of individuals at 
the centre of gravity of the Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice. 
 EU data protection acquis gives a special role to the consent of 
the data subject as a legitimate ground for accessing and processing 
data. When moving within the framework of law enforcement and 
criminal justice activities, MLA agreements laid down the rules for 
access to be lawful and legitimate, which encompass prior consent by 
the designated central authority of the requested state and legal 
scrutiny by an independent judicial authority which will validate the 
legitimacy and legality of accessing and processing electronic data.  
What are the applicable EU legal standards in a post-Lisbon Treaty 
landscape? This section provides a detailed overview of the main EU legal 
instruments with direct relevance when assessing the legality of access to 
data for law enforcement purposes. It starts by providing some conceptual 
clarifications as regards the relationship between EU data protection and 
criminal justice acquis and fundamental human rights in the EU legal system 
(section 3.1). It then outlines the standards and benchmarks which they 
provide in respect of privacy, data protection and the rights of the defence 
(sections 3.2-3.4). The EU has extensively exercised legal 
competence over domains related to privacy, criminal justice and 
cybercrime, and has developed a large body of law providing common 
supranational rule-of-law standards applicable to a large majority of 
Member States.  
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3.1. The Circular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, 
Privacy and Criminal Justice in the EU Legal System 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 brought about 
a profound reconfiguration of the constitutional foundations of the 
EU legal system and the so-called Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ).  
The Lisbon Treaty meant the expansion of the Community method of 
cooperation over a majority of European cooperation in criminal justice and 
police. This injected a higher degree of democratic accountability (European 
Parliament as co-legislator) and judicial control (Court of Justice of the 
European Union with jurisdiction to interpret and review EU law) in these 
domains. It converted the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights into a legally 
binding instrument, with the same value as the Treaties, and applicable to 
all European institutions, agencies and EU Member State authorities.  
The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the AFSJ has reinforced and enhanced EU 
competence over areas at the heart of the discussions surrounding access 
to data for law enforcement and criminal justice purposes. The EU Charter 
positions the individual and the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms at the heart of AFSJ cooperation.46 Of particular relevance 
are Articles 7 (Respect of Private and Family Life) and 8 (Protection of 
Personal Data), as well as those provided under Title VI (Justice), which 
cover the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial as well as the rights 
of the defence.47  
The Lisbon Treaty led to far-reaching modifications in the architecture of 
the right to data protection in the EU legal system, both in what concerns 
primary and secondary law (see section 3.2 below). There is an open debate 
in the academic literature as regards the reach and scope of the actual 
difference between the rights to privacy and the one of data protection as 
enshrined in the EU Charter, and the extent to which the fundamental right 
of data protection creates a specific and non-derivate system of 
protection.48 This discussion falls outside the scope of this study. That 
notwithstanding, it is important to stress the importance of the right to 
private life (Article 7 Charter and 8 ECHR) in the development of EU law. 
                                                   
46 S. Carrera and F. Geyer (2008), “The Reform Treaty and Justice and Home Affairs 
– Implications for the common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, in E. Guild 
and F. Geyer (eds), Security versus Justice? Police and Judicial Cooperation in the 
European Union, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 289-307. 
47 S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner and A. Ward (eds) (2014), The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Oxford: Hart Publishing.  
48 Ibid., H. Kranenborg Article 8 (Protection of Personal Data), pp. 22-264. For a 
debate refer to O. Lynskey (2014), “Deconstructing Data Protection: The ‘Added 
Value’ of a Right to Data Protection in the EU Legal Order”, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 63, Issue 3, pp. 569-597; See also J. Kokott and 
C. Sobotta (2013), “The distinction between privacy and data protection in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU and the EctHR”, International Data Privacy Law, Vol. 3, 
No. 4, pp. 222-228. G. González Fuster and S. Gutwirth (2013), “Opening up 
Personal Data Protection: A Conceptual Controversy,” Computer Law & Security 
Review, 29: 531-39. 
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What is clear in the current state of EU privacy and data protection acquis 
is the special role attributed to the consent of the data subject as 
legitimate key ground for the legitimacy for accessing and 
processing data. Article 8 EU Charter stipulates that processing of 
individuals’ data must be on the basis of the consent of the person 
concerned or some other legitimate grounds foreseen by law. The Data 
Protection Directive 95/46 also provides that consent constitutes one of the 
general grounds for lawfulness. The Article 29 Working Party has elaborated 
some conceptual clarifications as regards the actual reach of ‘consent’ for 
the purposes of EU data protection law in its Opinion 15/2011 on the 
definition of consent.49 
The legal value of consent in the EU legal system is central at times of 
examining transnational practices on access to data in European 
jurisdictions, and the legal dilemmas which they raise. Who can give 
consent to access and sharing data? For the purposes of EU law the 
answer is the data subject’s consent, which goes along the individual rights 
focus enshrined in the EU Charter.  
A broader notion of ‘consent’ includes the involvement or mediation by an 
independent authority in cases where the individual cannot be 
asked proper consent as the matter is one of criminal justice, which 
in most cases will correspond with an authorisation by an independent court 
of law or judicial authority. The prior consent by the designated central 
authority in the requested state and the supervision of an independent 
judicial actor play out a core component of the shapes of MLAs. As we will 
study in section 3.3 below, they are also at the core of EU criminal justice 
law, specifically the European Investigation Order (EIO). 
The relevance of ‘consent’, broadly understood, has been confirmed by the 
Article 29 Working Party’s Comments on the issue of unmediated access by 
third countries’ law enforcement authorities to data stored in other 
jurisdictions, as proposed in the draft elements for an additional protocol to 
the above-mentioned Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 5 December 
2013, Brussels. When addressing the compliance of the planned revision of 
the Cybercrime Convention in the Council of Europe, Article 29 WP mentions 
as one of the key issues of controversy that of “consent” and “whether a 
private entity could lawfully provide access to or disclose to data”. In its 
Comments it stated:  
According to the EU data protection acquis, there are two types 
of consent: the data subject’s consent means ‘any freely given 
specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data 
subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him 
being processed’…One of the requirements for the consent to be 
given is that it has to be ‘freely given’; this criterion is only fulfilled 
‘in the absence of negative consequences’. In particular, the 
Working Party notes that ‘[c]onsent can only be valid if the data 
subject is able to exercise a real choice, and there is no risk of 
deception, intimidation, coercion or significant negative 
consequences if he/she does not consent’. In a law enforcement 
                                                   
49 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion on the definition of consent 
15/2011, 13 July 2011. 
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context, however, ‘consent’ is also understood to be the consent of 
law enforcement/judicial authorities that need, in relation to a 
specific case, to exchange data50 [emphasis added]. 
In this respect, “prior consent of the transmitting Member State” acts as a 
condition in the Council Framework Decision 2008/977.51 Furthermore, this 
has direct implications when examining whether a private entity can 
lawfully provide access to or disclose the data. The Article 29 WP’s 
Comments emphasise this:  
According to this Directive (95/46), consent can only be given by 
data subjects. Therefore, companies acting as data controllers 
usually do not have the ‘lawful authority to disclose the data’ which 
they process…They can normally only disclose the data upon prior 
presentation of a judicial authorisation/warrant or any document 
justifying the need to access the data and referring to the relevant 
legal basis for this access, presented by a national law enforcement 
authority according to their domestic law that will specify the 
purpose for which data is required. Data controllers cannot lawfully 
provide access or disclose the data to foreign law enforcement 
authorities that operate under different legal and procedural 
framework from both a data protection and a criminal procedural 
point of view. 
This quotation exemplifies one of the key sources of controversy between 
the EU and the US in respect of access to data. The specificity of the EU 
data protection and privacy legal system as regards the conditions for 
legitimate and lawful grounds for interference to privacy through 
access to and processing of data is one where ‘consent’, broadly 
understood, in combination with other legitimate grounds and principles 
(e.g. fairness, necessity and proportionality)52 play here a crucial role. 
Moreover, the established transatlantic legal channels of judicial and law 
enforcement cooperation in the context of criminal investigations place the 
consent of the requested state (and a designated central authority usually 
corresponding with the Ministry of Justice), and the scrutiny by an 
independent and impartial court of law at the heart of the mediated system 
of access to data.  
The point of departure in every evaluation on whether US authorities can 
have access to or request electronic data directly from private companies 
in EU law is its incompatibility with the mediated access model provided by 
the MLA agreement. The role which has been given here to ‘consent’ by the 
requested authority and judicial supervision is of profound relevance in 
safeguarding rule of law and fundamental rights. Direct remote access to 
electronic data directly challenges these basic foundations, and leaves the 
door open to arbitrariness, fundamental rights breaches and legal 
uncertainty. 
                                                   
50 Pp. 2-3. 
51 See footnote 7 of the Article 29 WP Comments. 
52 See p. 7 of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion on the definition 
of consent 15/2011, 13 July 2011. 
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All the sources of applicable EU law standards are in this way intrinsically 
linked, in what could be described as a circular relationship (see Figure 
1 below). That relationship circulates around the question of ‘who’ can give 
consent to accessing and sharing data, which is central when testing the 
legality of third-country access to data held by private companies under EU 
jurisdiction.53 
Figure 1. Data Protection, Criminal Justice and Cybercrime: A Circular 
Relationship 
 
 
The next sub-sections establish the sector-specific EU legal standards of 
relevance when testing the legality of third-country access to electronic 
data held by private companies under EU jurisdiction. They provide a survey 
(see Table 1 below) of all legal instruments falling within the scope of Union 
law of relevance when examining the lawfulness of access to and the 
                                                   
53 In any case, data processed in this context must be regarded as particularly 
sensitive, taking into account its nature as well as the effects that such data 
processing or the related data processing may have on individuals. In this sense, 
see: European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), Opinion of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor on the Initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of 
Bulgaria, the Republic of Estonia, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the 
Italian Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese 
Republic, Romania, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Protection 
Order, and – on the Initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, 
the Republic of Estonia, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Austria, the Republic 
of Slovenia and the Kingdom of Sweden for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council Regarding the European Investigation Order in Criminal Matters 
(Brussels, 5 October 2010), p. 2. 
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legitimacy for processing of information for reasons of law enforcement and 
criminal justice investigations, in particular: EU privacy and data protection 
law (section 3.2), mutual legal assistance and criminal justice law (section 
3.3), and cybercrime law (section 3.4). 
Table 1. EU Legal Instruments on Criminal Justice, Privacy and Cybercrime 
Criminal Justice Privacy and Data 
Protection 
Cybercrime 
EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
(Articles 47-50) 
EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights 
(Articles 7 and 8) 
Cybercrime Directive (on 
attacks against information 
systems) 
EU-US Mutual Legal 
Assistance Agreement 
Data Protection 
Directive 
 
European Investigation 
Order (EIO) 
E-Privacy Directive 
 
 
 Data Retention 
Directive (annulled) 
 
 Data Protection 
Framework Decision 
 
 
3.2. Privacy and Data Protection 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The Council of Europe human rights framework in the European 
Convention of Human Rights constitutes the starting point when laying 
down EU privacy and data protection standards for EU Member States. 
 The scope of ‘private life’ under Article 8 ECHR is a broad term, 
non-susceptible of exhaustive definition. The protection of personal 
data is ‘of fundamental importance’ for the enjoyment of this right. 
Taking privacy as a reference point is most useful when assessing the 
impact of large-scale access to data on the relationship between the 
individual and the State. 
 One of the most important legal grounds developed by the 
European Court of Human Rights when examining the legality of States’ 
interferences on privacy and the rights of the defence in a law 
enforcement context is the ‘in accordance with the law test’. This 
requires a specific quality of the law, which must be sufficiently clear, 
precise and foreseeable. 
 The ECHR-based human right of privacy constitutes a 
cornerstone in the EU data protection acquis and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The fundamental rights of privacy and data 
protection are granted to everyone, not exclusively to EU citizens or 
residents. 
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 Article 8.2 EU Charter foresees that data must be processed 
fairly for specific purposes and on the basis of the unambiguous consent 
of the person involved or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
‘Consent’ plays a central role in the examining the legality and 
legitimacy of access to data. 
 According to the Data Protection Directive 95/46 when data 
processing activities of private companies fall under EU personal data 
protection law, these companies cannot freely export personal data to 
third countries, but must comply with applicable EU norms on cross-
border data transfers. 
 Lawful access for law enforcement purposes to data held by 
private companies under EU jurisdiction requires prior review carried 
out by a court or by an administrative (supervisory) independent body. 
 Current and upcoming legal developments on data protection, 
such as the EU-US umbrella agreement or the EU data protection 
package, make clear that data held by the private sector shall not be 
directly accessed by or transferred to US law enforcement authorities 
outside authorised/formal legal channels of cooperation. The 
negotiations of the EU-US umbrella agreement are being linked to the 
need to provide legal protection and effective judicial remedies for EU 
citizens similar to those for US citizens. 
The identification of European standards on privacy and data protection 
demands recognising privacy as a primordial human right in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) (section 3.1.1). Relevant EU standards on privacy and 
personal data protection derive from fundamental rights obligations 
enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and the Treaties, as 
well as from EU secondary law (section 3.1.2).54 
3.2.1. Council of Europe 
Legal instruments which have been adopted in the Council of Europe are 
especially relevant for EU law purposes. They also determine EU Member 
States’ obligations in the area of privacy and personal data 
protection. In addition to being crucial to the interpretation of the rights 
guaranteed by the EU Charter, the ECHR is of the utmost importance for 
EU law because the EU shall accede to it.55 Furthermore, all EU Member 
States are members of the Council of Europe (CoE) and obliged by the 
ECHR. CoE human rights instruments have been explicitly mentioned in 
several EU legal acts.56 They also determine the content of national laws 
applying to assessing the level of adequate protection of a third country.  
                                                   
54 See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe 
(2014), Handbook on European Data Protection Law, Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg. 
55 Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
56 Article 27 of the Europol Decision. 
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The most relevant instruments enshrined in the CoE context are: Article 8 
ECHR (section 3.1.1.1); the Convention 108 and its Additional Protocol 
(section 3.1.1.2) and the 1987 Recommendation on the Use of Personal 
Data in the Police Sector (section 3.1.1.3). 
3.2.1.1. Article 8 ECHR  
Article 8(1) of the ECHR states that:  
[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence’, and its Article 8(2) sets out that 
‘[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
Article 8 ECHR thus explicitly establishes a right to respect for private life, 
as well as a right to family life, the inviolability of the home and the 
confidentiality of communications. In recent decades, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been detailing the scope of Article 8 ECHR 
and the necessary requirements for interference to be regarded as lawful 
and legitimate. 
The ECtHR has notably asserted that ‘private life’ is a broad term not 
susceptible to exhaustive definition, and that the protection granted 
under Article 8 of the ECHR is not limited to the private sphere or the home 
of the individual. 
In Malone v. the United Kingdom,57 the Strasbourg Court examined a case 
concerning a practice whereby the Post Office provided to the police records 
about the communications despite the absence of a subpoena to compel 
the production of such records.58 The records concerned data obtained 
through the ‘metering’ of communications, and thus were not related to the 
communications’ content, but only to the numbers dialled on a particular 
telephone and the time and duration of each call.59  
The Court declared that taking into account that the records contained 
nevertheless “information, in particular the numbers dialled, which is an 
integral element in the communications made by telephone”, the “release 
of that information to the police without the consent of the subscriber” 
amounted to an interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the 
ECHR. 60  The disclosure of ‘metadata’ to law enforcement thus 
                                                   
57 ECtHR, Malone v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, 2 August 1984. 
58 Ibid., para. 86. 
59 Ibid., para. 83. 
60 The Court also noted that there was no rule in domestic law making it unlawful 
for the Post Office to voluntarily comply with requests from the police to make and 
supply this type of record, but also no rule delimiting the scope and manner of 
exercise of the discretion enjoyed by the public authorities, and that as a 
consequence the interference was not “in accordance with the law”. Ibid., paras. 
86-87. 
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constitutes a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR in absence of clear 
rules delimiting the role of public authorities.  
The ECtHR has also specified that e-mails and information derived from the 
monitoring of Internet usage, including e-mails sent from work and Internet 
usage at work, are protected under Article 8 of the ECHR in the same way 
as telephone calls.61 Telephone, facsimile and e-mail communications are 
covered jointly by the notions of ‘private life’ and ‘correspondence’ within 
the meaning of Article 8 of the ECHR.62 
In Taylor-Sabori v. the United Kingdom,63 the applicant’s communications 
had been accessed through a ‘clone’ of the applicant’s pager, and he was 
subsequently arrested and charged with conspiracy to supply a controlled 
drug. As at the time there was no provision in British law allowing for such 
interception, the interference was regarded by the European Court of 
Human Rights as not being ‘in accordance with law’.  
The Strasbourg Court has stressed that the requirement of being ‘in 
accordance with the law’ demands the existence of a provision of 
domestic law that must have certain qualities. In Liberty and others 
v. the United Kingdom, observing that the expression ‘in accordance with 
the law’ under Article 8(2) requires that the impugned measure should have 
some basis in domestic law, but also that such basis should be compatible 
with the rule of law and accessible to the person concerned, “who must, 
moreover, be able to foresee its consequences for him”, 64  the Court 
assessed that the United Kingdom’s legal provisions allowing it to intercept 
and examine external communications did not meet such requirements.65 
Secret measures of communications surveillance can be in accordance with 
the requirements of Article 8 of the ECHR if accompanied by some minimum 
safeguards, to be set out in statute law.66 
                                                   
61 ECtHR, Copland v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 62617/00, 3 April 2007, para. 
41. 
62 ECtHR, Liberty and others v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, 3 April 
2007, para. 56. 
63 ECtHR, Taylor-Sabori v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 47114/99, 22 October 
2002. 
64 Liberty and others v. the United Kingdom, para. 59. See also Kennedy v. United 
Kingdom, no. 26839/05, 18 May 2010; Rotaru v. Romania, no. 28341/95, ECHR 
2000-V; Amann v. Switzerland, no. 27798/95, ECHR 2000-II; Iordachi and Others 
v. Moldova, no. 25198/02, 10 February 2009; 
65 More concretely, the Court noted that the domestic law did not indicate “with 
sufficient clarity, so as to provide adequate protection against abuse of power, the 
scope or manner of exercise of the very wide discretion conferred on the State to 
intercept and examine external communications”, and, “[i]n particular, it did not, 
as required by the Court’s case-law, set out in a form accessible to the public any 
indication of the procedure to be followed for selecting for examination, sharing, 
storing and destroying intercepted material”. Ibid., para. 69. 
66 Determining “the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception 
order; a definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones 
tapped; a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed 
for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken 
when communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which 
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Therefore, any State interference over human rights provisions in a law 
enforcement context needs to be firmly anchored in legislation meeting the 
following three standards: first, the practice needs to have its basis in 
national law; second, the law must be accessible and sufficiently clear and 
precise to the individual; third, the consequences need to be foreseeable 
(foreseeability). 
The ECtHR has interpreted the scope of Article 8 ECHR as encompassing 
the compilation of data about individuals by public authorities.67 The Court 
has held in different judgments that the right to private life can be 
infringed by the collection, registration or use of personal 
information.68 More concretely, the Court has declared that the mere 
storing of data relating to the private life of an individual amounts to an 
interference within the meaning of Article 8, and that the subsequent use 
of the stored information has no bearing on that finding.  
In determining whether the personal information retained by the authorities 
involves any relevant private-life aspects, the Court will have due regard to 
the specific context in which the information has been recorded and 
retained, the nature of the records, the way in which these records are used 
and processed and the results that may be obtained. 
The Strasbourg Court has declared that the protection of personal data 
is “of fundamental importance” for the enjoyment of the right to respect for 
private life guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR. Domestic laws must afford 
appropriate safeguards to prevent any use of personal data that may be 
inconsistent with its guarantees.69 The Court has also emphasised that the 
need for such safeguards “is all the greater where the protection of personal 
data undergoing automatic processing is concerned, not least when such 
data are used for police purposes”.70 It has examined multiple situations 
related to the storage of personal data by public authorities.71 
In addition, the scope of Article 8 ECHR must be interpreted in accordance 
with the Council of Europe’s Convention of 28 January 1981 for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data (Convention 108) (see section 3.2.1.2 below). This 
implies that storing cards filled with information about individuals obtained 
                                                   
recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed”. ECtHR, Weber and 
Saravia v. Germany (decision as to the admissibility), App. No. 54934/00, 29 June 
2006. 
67 See, for instance, ECtHR, Uzun v Germany, App. No. 35623/05, 2 September 
2010. 
68 On this subject, see E. Brouwer (2008), Digital Borders and Real Rights: Effective 
Remedies for Third-Country Nationals in the Schengen Information System, 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 155-176. 
69 See ECtHR, S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, Nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, 
4 December 2008, § 103. 
70 Ibid. 
71 For example, ECtHR, Leander v. Sweden, No. 9248/81, 26 March 1987. 
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through the interception of their communications must be regarded as 
falling under Article 8 ECHR.72 
The S. and Marper case73 concerned two non-convicted individuals who 
wanted to have their records removed from a DNA database used for 
criminal identification in the United Kingdom. Specifically, they asked for 
their fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles, which had been 
obtained by police, to be destroyed. In its ruling, the Strasbourg Court 
established that it was contrary to the requirements of Article 8 of 
the ECHR to store for unlimited periods of time that type of personal 
information related to innocent people in a database of that nature. 
The ECtHR concluded that the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the 
powers granted to UK authorities constituted a disproportionate 
interference with the applicants’ right to respect for private life, and could 
not be considered necessary in a democratic society, amounting therefore 
to a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. 
Even when the interception of communications constitutes as such an 
interference with the rights protected under Article 8 ECHR, the 
transmission of the obtained data to other authorities has been recognised 
by the Strasbourg Court as representing a further separate interference 
with the rights enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR.74 
The Strasbourg Court has also specifically acknowledged the importance 
of avoiding the use of incorrect personal data in police reporting in 
criminal proceedings. In Cemalettin Canli v. Turkey,75 the Court found a 
violation of Article 8 of the ECHR following the unsuccessful requests made 
by the applicant to have amended an inaccurate police report submitted to 
a court in criminal proceedings, as well as police records. The ECtHR 
explicitly asserted that the information in the police report was within the 
scope of Article 8 of the ECHR.76 
3.2.1.2. Convention 108 
The Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to the 
automatic processing of personal data (Convention 108)77 was historically 
the first international legally binding instrument dealing with ‘data 
protection’, even if only covering the processing of personal data through 
automated means. Convention 108’s scope of application encompasses all 
                                                   
72 ECtHR, Amann v. Switzerland, No. 27798/95, 16 February 2000, paras 65-67. 
ECtHR, Rotaru v. Romania, 28341/95, 4 May 2000. In Rotaru v. Romania, the 
Court held that any kind of information about individuals, and thus also public 
information, can fall within the scope of Article 8 of the ECHR when systematically 
collected and stored in files held by authorities. 
73 ECtHR, S and Marper v. United Kingdom, 30562/04 and 30566/04, 4 December 
2008. 
74 Weber and Saravia v. Germany, para. 79. 
75 ECtHR, Cemalettin Canli v. Turkey, No. 22427/04, 18 November 2008. 
76 § 33. 
77 CoE, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, Council of Europe, CETS No. 108, 1981. 
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fields of automated personal data processing and therefore applies to 
data protection in the area of police and criminal justice, even though 
the contracting parties may limit its application. 
Opened for signature in 1981, Convention 108 entered into force in 1985. 
It has been signed and ratified by all EU Member States, as well as by some 
other Council of Europe Member States such as Russia, and one non-
Member (Uruguay). In 1999 the instrument was amended, allowing the EU 
to become a Party.78 
Convention 108 aims “to secure in the territory of each Party for every 
individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to 
automatic processing of personal data relating to him”.79 Therefore, it 
applies generally to all individuals whose data is processed. 
Convention 108 provides for the free flow of personal data between its 
parties, but imposes some restrictions on those flows to States where legal 
regulation does not provide equivalent protection.80 
In 2001, an Additional Protocol to Convention 108 was adopted and 
introduced provisions on transborder data flows to non-parties, and on 
the mandatory establishment of national data protection supervisory 
authorities.81 It has been ratified by a majority of EU Member States.82 
The 2001 Additional Protocol to Convention 108 describes transborder data 
flows as transfers of personal data to a recipient that is subject to the 
jurisdiction of a State or organisation that is not Party to Convention 108. 
It establishes that such transfers can only take place if that State or 
organisation ensures an adequate level of protection for the 
intended data transfer.83 
By way of derogation from such a general rule, each party may nevertheless 
allow for the data transfer if domestic law allows it because specific interests 
of the data subject or of “legitimate prevailing interests, especially 
important public interests”, or, still, “if safeguards, which can in particular 
result from contractual clauses, are provided by the controller responsible 
for the transfer and are found adequate by the competent authorities 
according to domestic law”.84 
                                                   
78  Council of Europe, Amendments to the Convention for the protection of 
individuals with regard to automatic processing of Personal Data (ETS No. 108) 
allowing the European Communities to accede, adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers, in Strasbourg, on 15 June 1999; Article 23 (2) of the Convention 108 in 
its amended form. 
79 Article 1 of Convention 108. 
80 Article 12 of Convention 108. 
81 Council of Europe, CoE, Additional Protocol to the Convention for the protection 
of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data, regarding 
supervisory authorities and transborder data flows, CETS No. 181, 2001. 
82 The EU Member States that have not ratified the 2001 Additional Protocol are 
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Malta, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. 
83 Article 2 (1) of the 2001 Additional Protocol. 
84 Article 2 (2) of the 2001 Additional Protocol. 
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3.2.1.3. Recommendation No. R (87) 15 
In 1987, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers adopted a 
Recommendation on the Use of Personal Data in the Police Sector.85 It 
provides guidance for the collection, storage, use and communication of 
personal data for police purposes that are the subject of automatic 
processing. 
The Recommendation’s guidance on “international communication” of data 
indicates that the transfer of data to foreign authorities should be 
restricted to police bodies, and that it should only be permissible “if there 
exists a clear legal provision under national or international law”, or, in the 
absence of such a provision, “if the communication is necessary for the 
prevention of a serious and imminent danger or is necessary for the 
suppression of a serious criminal offence under ordinary law”, but in any 
case exclusively “provided that domestic regulations for the protection of 
the person are not prejudiced”.86 
The Council of Europe’s Project Group on Data Protection (CJ-PD) has 
pointed out that bilateral or multilateral agreements on the exchange 
of police data may, for the purpose of data protection, contain 
provisions on the types of data to be transferred, the authorities which could 
control the data, the prohibition in principle on the transfer of the data to 
other authorities or private parties, the obligation to ensure the right of 
data subjects to have information about them and to obtain the correction 
of their data, the obligation to delete the data after the fulfilment of the 
purpose for which the data were transferred and to inform each other about 
the time limit of storage of the data under their law, as well as the possibility 
for the data subject to have an effective remedy before an independent 
authority.87 
3.2.2. EU Fundamental Rights Requirements 
Fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of EU law, 
and are currently set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU88 
(hereafter, the ‘EU Charter’).89 The EU Charter generally reaffirms the rights 
                                                   
85 Recommendation No. R (87) 15 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States 
regulating the use of personal data in the police sector, adopted by the Committee 
of Ministers on 17 September 1987. 
86 See Article 5(4) of Recommendation No. R (87) 15. 
87 Project Group on Data Protection (CJ-PD), Report on the Third Evaluation of 
Recommendation no. R(87) 15 regulating the use of personal data in the police 
sector, 2002, p. 12. 
88 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 30 March 2010, OJ C83, 
p. 389. 
89 On the key relevance of the EU Charter as a starting point for issues related to 
EU personal data protection, see CJEU, Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google 
Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 
para. 68. More generally, on the EU Charter refer to G. De Búrca (2013), “After 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights 
Adjudicator?”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 20, no. 2, pp. 
168-84. 
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guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) as interpreted in the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, to be taken into account for its 
interpretation. 90  EU fundamental rights are generally granted to 
‘everyone’, and not exclusively to EU citizens or EU residents. 
The EU Charter is legally binding since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in December 2009. As established by Article 51(1), its provisions:  
…are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of 
the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They 
shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and 
promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective 
powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as 
conferred on it in the Treaties.  
It is thus binding on EU institutions, and on Member States when 
acting within the scope of EU law. The European Commission oversees 
respect of the EU Charter by EU Member States, under the control of the 
CJEU, and can open infringement proceedings in case of breach. All EU law 
provisions and national law based on EU law must be interpreted by national 
courts and judges in coherence with EU Charter obligations. 
Two main articles of the EU Charter delimit the EU’s obligations in relation 
to privacy and personal data protection: Article 7 and Article 8. Article 7 EU 
Charter enshrines the rights to respect for private life and the confidentiality 
of communications; whereas Article 8 lays down a right to the protection of 
personal data.91  
3.2.2.1. Article 7 EU Charter 
Article 7 establishes that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her 
private and family life, home and communications”. This provision 
corresponds to Article 8 of the ECHR, and shall thus be interpreted 
accordingly and take into account the case law of the ECtHR,92 which has 
notably asserted that ‘private life’ is a broad term not susceptible to 
exhaustive definition (see section 3.1.1.1 above). 
The European Court of Human Rights case law on Article 8 of the ECHR 
provides crucial guidance on its scope and the requirements applicable to 
lawful interferences with the right to respect for private life. The Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg has notably asserted 
                                                   
90 Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
91 The rights protected under Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter can be limited in 
accordance with the requirements detailed in Article 52(1) of the EU Charter, which 
states: “Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by 
this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights 
and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made 
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”. 
92 The first sentence of Article 52(3) states: “In so far as this Charter contains 
rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those 
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention”. 
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the relevance of Article 8 of the ECHR and the right to privacy for the 
interpretation of EU personal data protection in 2003, in the Rundfunk 
judgment.93 
3.2.2.2. Article 8 EU Charter 
Article 8(1) of the EU Charter sets out that:  
[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her’. Article 8(2) adds that ‘[s]uch data must be 
processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid 
down by law’, and that ‘[e]veryone has the right of access to data 
which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to 
have it rectified’. Finally, Article 8(3) establishes that ‘[c]ompliance 
with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority’.  
The fundamental right to the protection of personal data is also enshrined 
in the EU Treaties.94 The EU fundamental right to the protection of personal 
data foresees that personal data can only be processed for specified 
purposes.95  
The right to the protection of personal data also sets out that personal data 
can only be processed on the basis of legitimate grounds laid down by 
law, or the consent of the individual concerned. This relates to the 
principle that lawful processing can only take place on the basis of a 
legitimate ground. Such ground might be the consent of the individual, but 
otherwise it must be a ground laid down by a law.  
The need for a legitimate ground in order to process personal data applies 
generally to any data processing activity, which can include the collection, 
storage, and making available or accessing data. Therefore, it is not only 
necessary, for instance, for a private company to base its processing and 
eventual storage of data on a legitimate ground (consent or a ground laid 
down by law); if a public authority wishes to access the data held by the 
private company, such access shall also be based on a legitimate ground 
(consent or a ground laid down by law). 
The right to the protection of personal data also establishes that when 
personal data are processed the individuals concerned have a right to 
access, and a right to correct, inaccurate data, and that compliance 
with personal data protection rules needs to be monitored by an 
                                                   
93 CJEU, Rechnungshof (C-465/00) v. Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others and 
Christa Neukomm (C-138/01) and Joseph Lauermann (C-139/01) v. 
Österreichischer Rundfunk, Judgment of the Court of 20 May 2003, notably 
paragraph 68. 
94 See Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
On this right, see also G. González Fuster (2014), The Emergence of Personal Data 
Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU, Dordrecht: Springer. 
95 Purpose specification is one of the basic principles of European data protection 
law. It consolidates a link between the legitimacy of personal data processing to 
the limitation of the aims of the processing: any personal data processing without 
a clearly defined purpose shall be regarded as unlawful. 
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independent data protection authority.96 The case law of the ECtHR on 
the limitations related to data processing developed under Article 8 of the 
ECHR is directly relevant for the interpretation of Article 8 of the EU 
Charter.97  
3.2.2.3. EU Secondary Law on Data Protection  
EU secondary law on personal data protection is profoundly marked by the 
legacy of the EU’s evolution. The main EU data protection instrument does 
not apply to data processing in the area of police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters, which is only regulated at EU level in the context of 
cross-border data processing. 
a. Data Protection Directive 
A key legal instrument in EU secondary legislation is Directive 95/46/EC of 
the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data (Data Protection Directive).98 The Data 
Protection Directive aimed at harmonising data protection in the single 
market. The Court of Justice of the European Union has asserted that 
harmonisation of national laws is “generally complete”,99 which limits the 
possibilities for EU Member States to depart from its provisions. 
The Data Protection Directive’s Preamble proclaims that data processing 
systems must, “whatever the nationality or residence of natural persons, 
respect their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to 
privacy”.100 In accordance with the Directive, Member States shall thus 
protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all natural persons, 
and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of 
personal data.101 
                                                   
96 The EU Court of Justice has underlined the importance of the independence 
requirement, and has ruled several times on the issue. See: CJEU, C-518/07, 
European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 9 March 2010; CJEU, C-
288/12, European Commission v. Hungary, 8 June 2012; CJEU, C-614/10, 
European Commission v. Republic of Austria, 16 October 2012. 
97 Noting that it is not extraordinary for the CJEU to refer to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights in cases where the rights to respect for private 
life and personal data protection under Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter apply: 
Legal Service of the European Parliament (2015), Legal Opinion in Reference to 
Questions Relating to the Judgment of the Court of Justice of 8 April 2014 in Joined 
Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others – 
Directive 2006/24/EC on Data Retention – Consequences of the Judgment, p. 9. 
98 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, OJ L281, 23.11.1995, pp. 31-50. 
99  CJEU, Joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación Nacional de 
Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF) and Federación de Comercio 
Electrónico y Marketing Directo (FECEMD) v. Administración del Estado, 24 
November 2011, paras 28-29. 
100 Recital (2) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
101 Article 1(1) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
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The material scope of the Data Protection Directive does not include matters 
of police and criminal justice cooperation. 102  Directive 95/46/EC was 
adopted in 1995 as an internal market instrument, exclusively dealing with 
processing activities falling under Community law.  
For the purposes of the Data Protection Directive, the location of data is not 
as such a criterion to determine territorial applicability. National provisions 
implementing the Data Protection Directive apply to any processing carried 
out in the context of the activities of an establishment of a data 
controller on the territory of an EU Member State.103 They also apply 
if the data controller is not established on the Member State’s territory, but 
in a place where the Member State’s national law applies by virtue of 
international public law.104 And if the data controller is not established on 
EU territory but, nevertheless, makes use, for the purpose of processing 
personal data, of equipment situated on the territory of a Member State, 
the Data Protection Directive shall also apply, unless such equipment is 
used only for purposes of transit through EU territory.105 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has stressed that EU 
personal data protection law must be interpreted as to offer effective and 
complete protection of data subjects, that is, of the individuals whose 
personal data is processed. In May 2014, the Luxembourg Court 
emphasised that Directive 95/46/EC prescribes a “particularly broad 
territorial scope” in order to prevent individuals from being deprived of 
protection.106 The CJEU declared that, in light of the Directive’s objective of 
ensuring effective and complete protection of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of natural persons, its provisions on territorial scope of application 
“cannot be interpreted restrictively”.107  
The territorial application of EU data protection law cannot be interpreted 
narrowly, as it pursues the delivery of effective and complete protection of 
data subjects. When data processing activities of private companies fall 
under EU personal data protection law, these companies cannot export 
personal data to third countries, but must comply with applicable 
EU norms on cross-border data transfers. Here, the basic rule is that 
data transfers to any countries outside the EU 108  shall be in principle 
forbidden, unless the third country provides for an “adequate level” of 
                                                   
102 Article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
103 Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
104 Article 4(1)(b) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
105 Article 4(1)(c) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
106 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, Judgment of the Court 
(Grand Chamber) of 13 May 2014, § 53.  
107 Google Spain SL and Google Inc., para. 54.  
108 The reference to the EU must be understood here as encompassing all European 
Economic Area (EEA) countries, that is, including Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway, as the territorial application of the Data Protection Directive reaches 
beyond the 28 EU Member States. 
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protection.109 Article 25(1) of the Data Protection Directive sets out indeed 
that, in principle, “the transfer to a third country of personal data which are 
undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer” may 
take place only if the third country in question ensures an adequate level of 
protection.110 
It is possible to transfer data to third countries that have not been 
recognised as providing an adequate level of protection if the data controller 
adduces additional safeguards (for instance, by using contractual clauses 
or Binding Corporate Rules, BCRs), 111  adopts standard contractual 
clauses,112 or refers to one of the six derogations listed in Article 26(1) of 
Directive 95/46/EC, such as the data subject’s unambiguous 
consent,113 or the fact that the transfer is necessary or legally required on 
important public interest grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or 
defence of legal claims.114 
The US is not regarded as providing an adequate level of protection 
for personal data in light of EU standards. To facilitate data transfers 
to the US despite this fact, the U.S. Department of Commerce in 
consultation with the European Commission developed in 2000 a ‘Safe 
Harbour’ framework, which the European Commission considered as 
providing an adequate level of protection. The Safe Harbour framework is 
based on self-certification, and allows companies committing to a series of 
principles to be able to transfer personal data from the EU to the US.  
The protection granted by the Safe Harbour approach, nevertheless, has 
since then been questioned. In 2013, the European Commission 
recommended that privacy policies of self-certified companies “should 
include information on the extent to which US law allows public authorities 
to collect and process data transferred under the Safe Harbour”, 115 and that 
companies “should be encouraged to indicate in their privacy policies when 
they apply exceptions…to meet national security, public interest or law 
enforcement requirements”.116  
A case is currently pending before the CJEU, on whether the European 
Commission’s decision creating the EU-US Safe Harbour is (still) valid in 
                                                   
109 Article 25(1) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
110 Article 25(1) of the Directive 95/46/EC. 
111 Article 26(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
112 Article 26(4) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
113 Article 26(1)(a) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
114 Article 26(1)(d) of Directive 95/46/EC. 
115 European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens 
and Companies Established in the EU, COM(2013) 847 final, Brussels, 27.11.2013, 
p. 19. 
116 Ibid. 
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light of revelations regarding mass surveillance by US authorities.117 In the 
meantime, a new Safe Harbour agreement is being discussed between the 
US and the EU. 
b. E-Privacy Directive 
Directive 2002/58/EC on the processing of personal data and the protection 
of privacy in the electronic communications sector (e-Privacy Directive)118 
was adopted in 2002 to complement and particularise the provisions of the 
Data Protection Directive for the telecommunications sector. 
The e-Privacy Directive imposes on Member States the obligation to ensure 
through national legislation the confidentiality of communications and 
related ‘traffic data’ by means of public communications networks 
and publicly available electronic communications services.119 ‘Traffic 
data’ are defined as any data processed for the purpose of the conveyance 
of a communication on an electronic communications network or for the 
billing thereof.120 
Listening, tapping, storing or other kinds of interception or surveillance of 
communications and the related traffic data by persons other than users, 
without the consent of the users concerned, is only possible when legally 
authorised in accordance with Article 15(1) of the e-Privacy Directive. By 
virtue of Article 15(1), Member States may adopt laws restricting the scope 
of rights of individuals:  
…when such restriction constitutes a necessary, appropriate and 
proportionate measure within a democratic society to safeguard 
national security (i.e. State security), defence, public security, and 
the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal 
offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communication 
system.121  
                                                   
117  Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, 
reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court of Ireland (Ireland) made on 
25 July 2014. 
118 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 
2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector, OJ [2002] L201, as amended by Directive 
2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 on 
cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of 
consumer protection laws, OJ [2009] L337. 
119 Article 15 of Directive 2002/58/EC. 
120 Article 2(b) of Directive 2002/58/EC. The e-Privacy Directive also uses the 
notion of ‘location data’, referring to traffic data related to the location of the 
communication device. 
121  The provision also refers to Article 13(1) of Directive 95/46/EC, which 
authorises the Member States to adopt legislative measures to restrict the 
obligation of confidentiality of personal data where that restriction is necessary, 
inter alia, for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
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The provision specifies that to such end Member States may adopt laws 
providing for the retention of data for a limited period of time. Any national 
measures, however, “shall be in accordance with the general principles of 
Community law”, including fundamental rights. 
c. The invalidated Data Retention Directive 
In 2006, Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or 
processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks (the ‘Data 
Retention Directive’)122 transformed the possibility granted by Article 15(1) 
of the e-Privacy Directive into an obligation. More concretely, it obliged 
communication service providers to keep traffic data for a period of at least 
six but not more than 24 months, and to make available such data to law 
enforcement authorities for the purposes of fighting serious crime. 
On 8 April 2014, the CJEU ruled in the Digital Rights Ireland ruling that 
the Data Retention Directive was invalid for infringements of the 
fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data guaranteed 
by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.123 More concretely, it held that the 
interference by the Data Protection Directive with the fundamental rights to 
respect for private life and to the protection of personal data was not limited 
to what is strictly necessary. 
The Court confirmed that the amount and precision of the data covered by 
the Data Retention Directive allowed very precise conclusions to be drawn 
concerning people’s private lives. This conflicted with the right to 
respect for private life (as protected by Article 7 of the EU Charter) 
and it therefore must be considered to be particularly serious 
interference. The CJEU held that access to and collection of metadata is 
not an interference with privacy simply because the authorities do not have 
access to the content of communications such as e-mails and phone 
conversations.124 
In this sense, the Luxembourg Court noted that Directive 2006/24/EC did 
not lay down any objective criterion by which the number of persons 
authorised to access and subsequently use the data retained was limited to 
what is strictly necessary in the light of the objective pursued. “Above all”, 
states the judgment, the access by competent national authorities to the 
data was problematically  
                                                   
122 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 
2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public 
communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC (Data Retention 
Directive), OJ [2006] L105. 
123 CJEU, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and 
Kärntner Landesregierung, Michael Seitlinger, Christof Tschohl and others. The 
judgment was delivered in response to two requests for preliminary rulings. 
124 For the EU now, access to or collection of ‘metadata’ is by definition an invasion 
with privacy. See E. Guild and S. Carrera (2014), “The Political and Judicial Life of 
Metadata: Digital Rights Ireland and the Trail of the Data Retention Directive”, 
CEPS Liberty and Security Series, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
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not made dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or by 
an independent administrative body whose decision seeks to 
limit access to the data and their use to what is strictly necessary 
for the purpose of attaining the objective pursued and which 
intervenes following a reasoned request of those authorities 
submitted within the framework of procedures of prevention, 
detection or criminal prosecutions125 (emphasis added). 
Access for law enforcement purposes to data held by private companies 
thus imperatively requires the prior review of carried out by a court or by 
an administrative independent body. 
d. Data Protection Framework Decision  
The Council’s Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA on the protection of 
personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters (the ‘Data Protection Framework Decision’)126 aims at 
providing protection of personal data when processed for the purpose of 
preventing, investigating, detecting or prosecuting a criminal offence or of 
executing a criminal penalty. The scope of application of the Framework 
Decision is limited to cross-border cooperation between authorities, and 
thus applies only to data obtained in the course of cross-border cooperation. 
It does not encompass national security. 
The Framework Decision foresees that the receiving Member State must 
respect any restrictions on further exchange of data established in 
the law of the transmitting Member State. Onward transfer of data to 
competent authorities in third countries requires the consent of the Member 
State from which the data originate, although there are exemptions 
foreseen for urgent cases. Such onward transfer can in principle only take 
place if the third country concerned ensures an adequate level of 
protection for the intended data processing,127 a level of adequacy to 
be assessed taking into account the nature of the data, the purpose and 
duration of the processing, the country of origin and the country of final 
destination of the data, the rules of law in force in the third country in 
question and the professional rules and security measures which apply.128 
By way of derogation from the general requirement of providing an 
adequate level of protection, personal data might be transferred to a third 
country regarded as generally not providing an adequate level if the 
national law of the transferring Member State allows it because of a 
legitimate specific interest of the data subject or “legitimate prevailing 
interests, especially important public interests”, or still if the receiving third 
                                                   
125 Digital Rights Ireland, para. 62. The prior review body should consider every 
request for access to the data following a reasoned request from the law 
enforcement authorities seeking access in order to ensure that the access, if 
permitted, is strictly necessary to achieve only the identified legitimate objective. 
126  Council of the European Union (2008), Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed 
in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, OJ 2008 
L350. 
127 Article 13(1)(d) of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
128 Article 13(4) of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
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country “provides safeguards which are deemed adequate by the Member 
State concerned according to its national law”.129 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA has been an extremely controversial 
legal instrument since its adoption, due its limited scope of application, the 
weak level of protection it establishes,130 and its regulation of transfers of 
personal data to third countries. The instrument’s limitations appear 
particularly problematic in a post-Lisbon perspective,131 notably taking into 
account the collapse of the EU’s ‘Third Pillar’ and the existence of a legal 
basis in EU treaties alluding to need to regulate data protection across EU 
law. 
3.2.2.4. Current and Upcoming developments 
There are a series of important forthcoming instruments currently being 
discussed, with important implications for EU privacy and personal data 
protection for the purposes of this study. These developments mirror the 
need to ensure efficient safeguards for the fundamental rights to the 
protection of privacy and personal data in light of the ongoing proliferation 
of personal data processing and the 2013 revelations on worldwide 
surveillance programmes.132 
a. The ‘umbrella’ agreement 
The EU and the US have been negotiating an agreement on the protection 
of personal data when transferred and processed for the purpose of 
preventing, investigating, detecting or prosecuting criminal offences, 
including terrorism, in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. This instrument is commonly referred to as the EU-US 
‘umbrella’ agreement. 
Negotiations on this agreement have been ongoing since 2010, when they 
were launched based on work previously undertaken by the High-Level 
Contact Group on Information-Sharing and Privacy and Personal Data 
Protection (HLCG). The HLCG, established in 2006, had presented a final 
report in 2008, followed by an addendum in 2009. Documents from the 
Council on the umbrella agreement are only partially declassified.133 The 
                                                   
129 Article 13(3) of Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
130 On this subject, see H. Hijmans and A. Scirocco (2009), “Shortcomings in EU 
Data Protection in the Third and the Second Pillars: Can the Lisbon Treaty Be 
Expected to Help?,” Common Market Law Review, 46, pp. 1485- 1525 (especially 
p. 1494). 
131 In this sense, see for instance M. O’Neill (2010), “The Issue of Data Protection 
and Data Security in the (Pre-Lisbon) EU Third Pillar”, Journal of Contemporary 
European Research, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 211-235.  
132  European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: 2014 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, COM(2015) 191 Final (Brussels, August 5, 2015), pp. 12-13. 
133 Council of the EU, Partial declassification of document 12408/10 RESTREINT UE 
dated 23 July 2010, Brussels, 22 September 2010, 12408/10 EXT 1 JAI 645 DAPIX 
10 US 100 DATAPROTECT 59 RELEX 667. 
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negotiations are believed to be currently waiting for progress on what has 
been identified as the main outstanding issue for the EU, which is to 
provide EU citizens who are not resident in the US the right to 
judicial redress if their data has been mishandled.134 
The commitment of the European Commission to conclude the negotiations 
of the ‘umbrella’ agreement, and the importance of securing procedural 
safeguards for EU citizens, were further emphasised in the Communication 
adopted by the Commission in 2013 as a reaction to the Snowden 
revelations, Rebuilding trust in EU-US data flows.135 The Communication 
noted that the notion of ‘EU citizens’ must be understood as encompassing 
also non-EU citizens falling under the scope of EU personal data protection 
law.136  
According to the Rebuilding trust in EU-US data flows Communication, the 
negotiations of the ‘umbrella’ agreement provide an opportunity for the EU 
to make clear that personal data held by private companies and located in 
the EU shall not be directly accessed by or transferred to US law 
enforcement authorities outside of formal channels of cooperation such as 
MLA or sector-specific agreements – unless in “clearly defined, exceptional 
and judicially reviewable situations”.137 The European Commission added 
that the US should undertake clear commitments in this regard.138 
b. Review of EU Data Protection Framework 
The EU personal data protection legal landscape is being reviewed. The 
European Commission introduced in 2012 a legislative package consisting 
of two proposals accompanied by a Communication. 139  The first is a 
proposal for a Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation), 140  introduced to 
replace Directive 95/46/EC. 
                                                   
134 Joint Press Statement following the EU-US-Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial 
Meeting of 18 November 2013 in Washington, D.C., European Commission, 18 
November 2013. 
135 European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament and to the 
Council: Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows, COM(2013) 846 final, Brussels, 
27.11.2013, p. 10. 
136 Ibid., p. 2. 
137 Ibid., p. 8. 
138 Ibid. 
139 European Commission, Safeguarding Privacy in a Connected World: A European 
Data Protection Framework for the 21st Century, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2012) 9 final, Brussels, 
25.1.2012. 
140 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, Brussels, 25.1.2012. 
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The second is a proposal for a Directive on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the 
purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of 
such data,141 put forward to replace Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
The legislative package is based on Article 16 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of European Union (TFEU).142  
In March 2014, the European Parliament adopted a compromise text of the 
proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation143 and on the proposed 
Directive,144 endorsing versions previously approved by its Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs in 2013. 
After the Council adopted a general approach on the proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation, trilogue negotiations between representatives of the 
Council and the European Parliament, together with the European 
Commission, were launched in June 2015 and should be concluded by the 
end of 2015. The Council aims at reaching a general approach on the 
proposed Directive in autumn 2015, allowing the start trilogue meetings on 
the Directive that would then run in parallel with those on the Regulation. 
c. Proposed General Data Protection Regulation 
In the 2013 report on the proposed General Data Protection Regulation of 
the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (LIBE), the rapporteur, Jan Philipp Albrecht, declared he strongly 
regretted that the European Commission’s proposed draft Regulation failed 
to cover law enforcement cooperation, leaving “legal uncertainty as regards 
rights and obligation in borderline issues, for instance where commercial 
                                                   
141 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data, COM(2012) 10 final, 
25.1.2012, Brussels. 
142 Article 16 TFEU states, “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal 
data concerning them” and that “[t]he European Parliament and the Council, acting 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down the rules 
relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by the Member States 
when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Union law, and the rules 
relating to the free movement of such data”. 
143 European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for 
a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) (COM(2012)0011 – 
C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)). 
144 European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for 
a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities 
for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such 
data (COM(2012)0010 – C7-0024/2012 – 2012/0010(COD)). 
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data is accessed by law enforcement authorities for law enforcement 
purposes and transfers between authorities that are responsible for law 
enforcement and those that are not”.145  
The draft General Data Protection Regulation proposed by the European 
Commission revises the criteria applicable to determining the territorial 
scope of application of EU personal data protection law. The criterion 
of the establishment of the controller is maintained. The criterion of the use 
of equipment is abandoned, and introduced instead is a provision stating 
that the Regulation shall apply “to the processing of personal data of data 
subjects residing in the Union by a controller not established in the Union, 
where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or 
services to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the monitoring of their 
behaviour”.146  
This could be perceived as an attempt to widen the territorial scope of EU 
personal data protection law, as the Regulation shall be applicable 
when a company targets European consumers even if it does not 
use equipment based in the EU. The limitation of protection to the data 
of individuals residing in the EU introduces, however, an unprecedented 
limitation of the scope of an EU personal data protection instrument. 
Regarding the regulation of data transfers to third countries, the Preamble 
to the proposed General Data Protection Regulation, in the draft introduced 
by the European Commission, declares: “Some third countries enact laws, 
regulations and other legislative instruments which purport to directly 
regulate data processing activities of natural and legal persons under the 
jurisdiction of the Member States”, 147  adding, “[t]he extraterritorial 
application of these laws, regulations and other legislative instruments may 
be in breach of international law and may impede the attainment of the 
protection of individuals guaranteed in the Union by this Regulation”.148  
In this context, it indicates that only transfers meeting the applicable 
conditions set out by the Regulation shall be allowed, which may be the 
case “where the disclosure is necessary for an important ground of public 
interest recognised in Union law or in a Member State law to which the 
controller is subject”.149  
Discussions at the Council of the EU have showed that some EU Member 
States delegations question the relevance of the ‘adequate protection’ 
approach, taking into account that in practice manifold exceptions included 
                                                   
145 See Explanatory Statement of Report of 22 November 2013 on the proposal for 
a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), (COM(2012)0011 – 
C7-0025/2012 – 2012/0011(COD)), Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs, Rapporteur: Jan Philipp Albrecht. 
146 Article 3(2) of the proposed General Data Protection Regulation. 
147 COM(2012) 11 final, p. 31. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
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in the proposed Regulation would empty the rule of its meaning. 150 
Furthermore, some national delegations have questioned the feasibility of 
maintaining an adequacy test in reference to massive flows of personal data 
in the context of cloud computing, asking whether a transfer of data in that 
context or the disclosure of data on the Internet shall be regarded as a 
transfer of data.151    
In March 2014, the European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution on 
the proposed General Data Protection Regulation, putting on the table a 
proposed new Article, Article 43a, on “Transfers or disclosures not 
authorised by Union law”. The first paragraph of the proposed Article states: 
No judgment of a court or tribunal and no decision of an 
administrative authority of a third country requiring a controller or 
processor to disclose personal data shall be recognized or be 
enforceable in any manner, without prejudice to a mutual legal 
assistance treaty or an international agreement in force between the 
requesting third country and the Union or a Member State (emphasis 
added). 
[While the second adds that] Where a judgment of a court or tribunal 
or a decision of an administrative authority of a third country 
requests a controller or processor to disclose personal data, the 
controller or processor and, if any, the controller’s representative, 
shall notify the supervisory authority of the request without undue 
delay and must obtain prior authorisation for the transfer or 
disclosure by the supervisory authority.  
The two remaining paragraphs of the proposed Article 43a detail the 
procedure to be followed by the supervisory authority, which includes the 
possibility to foresee informing the affected data subjects.152 The 
position adopted by the European Parliament thus accepts the possibility 
that a court or tribunal or a decision of an administrative authority of a third 
country requests a controller or processor to disclose personal data outside 
mutual legal assistance treaties or other international agreements, but 
conditions acceptance of such requests to a prior authorisation by 
a supervisory authority. 
                                                   
150 Council of the EU, Note on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), 9398/15, Brussels, 1 June 2015, p. 181. 
151 Ibid. 
152  “The supervisory authority shall assess the compliance of the requested 
disclosure with the Regulation and in particular whether the disclosure is necessary 
and legally required in accordance with points (d) and (e) of Article 44(1) and 
Article 44(5). Where data subjects from other Member States are affected, the 
supervisory authority shall apply the consistency mechanism referred to in Article 
57”, and “The supervisory authority shall inform the competent national authority 
of the request. Without prejudice to Article 21, the controller or processor shall 
also inform the data subjects of the request and of the authorisation by the 
supervisory authority and where applicable inform the data subject whether 
personal data was provided to public authorities during the last consecutive 12-
month period, pursuant to point (ha) of Article 14(1)”. 
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d. Proposed Data Protection Directive 
The European Parliament adopted also in March 2014 a legislative 
resolution proposing to amend the draft Data Protection Directive to clarify 
the requirements applicable to the use for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution 
of criminal penalties of data initially processed for other purposes.  
The proposed Article 43a states that competent authorities may only have 
access to personal data initially processed for other purposes only if 
“specifically authorised by Union or Member State law” meeting necessity 
requirements and that shall provide that access is limited to authorised staff 
of the competent authorities in the performance of their tasks “where, in a 
specific case, reasonable grounds give reason to believe that the processing 
of the personal data will substantially contribute to the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution 
of criminal penalties”, that requests for access be in writing and refer to the 
legal ground for the request, that the written request be documented; and 
that “appropriate safeguards are implemented to ensure the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms in relation to the processing of personal 
data…without prejudice to and complementary to specific conditions of 
access to personal data such as judicial authorisation in accordance with 
Member State law”. The proposed provision further states, “Personal data 
held by private parties or other public authorities shall only be accessed to 
investigate or prosecute criminal offences in accordance with necessity and 
proportionality requirements”, as defined by EU and national laws. 
 
3.3. Mutual Legal Assistance and Criminal Justice Law 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Article 47 EU Charter stipulates a right to an effective remedy and fair 
trial before a tribunal. It therefore underlines the judicial nature of the scrutiny 
when examining the legality of States’ interferences with the rights of defence 
in criminal procedures. 
 Supranational cooperation and assistance in criminal law matters have 
been settled in Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT). A case in point is the 
2003 EU-US MLA. 
 The EU-US MLA constitutes a flexible tool for cooperation, which 
sometimes provides an excessively broad basis for exchange of information 
and a number of exceptions allowing for a wide array of judicial assistance 
options. The Agreement contains a rather weak data protection framework, 
thus privacy concerns rarely constitute a barrier to cooperation. 
 The emphasis given by the EU-US MLA to the maintenance or 
establishment of bilateral relations between EU Member States and the US 
does not negate EU Member States’ obligations under EU law. The EU-US 
agreement is a full supranational EU agreement. It must be therefore 
interpreted in light of EU primary (Treaty) law, the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights as well as European secondary legislation. 
Access to Electronic Data by Third-Country Law Enforcement Authorities | 43 
 
 The European Investigation Order (EIO) regulates the exchange of 
evidence between EU Member States in the area of criminal justice. It 
introduces a system of ‘mutual recognition’ based on a minimum of formalities 
and speed. 
 The EIO represents a benchmark for future internal and external EU 
action in the area of access to data and evidence in judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. While the EIO model allows for the procedures for 
exchanging evidence between EU Member States, it also provides the 
necessary safeguards for guaranteeing the rule of law and fundamental rights 
protection. It does so by including a set of provisions preventing automatic 
mutual recognition and making cooperation subject to States’ legal and 
constitutional systems, proportionality and fundamental rights tests, and the 
involvement of independent judicial authorities. 
A second set of EU legal standards relates to criminal justice in the form of 
international agreements and secondary legislation. Title VI of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Justice)153 provides the basis upon which 
these instruments need to be interpreted and applied in practice. Of 
particular relevance for the scope of this study is Article 47 EU Charter. This 
provision stipulates a right to an effective remedy and fair trial:  
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the 
Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a 
tribunal. Everyone is entitled to a fair trial and public hearing within 
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
previously established by law… 
The judicial nature of scrutiny finds its foundations in CJEU case 
law, which has previously considered judicial accountability a general 
principle of EU law.154 In the light of this, the relevance of effective and 
open justice, as well as effective judicial scrutiny, constitutes a central 
component of the EU legal system when assessing the legality and 
legitimacy of law enforcement and criminal justice authorities’ interferences 
with EU Charter rights. This is even the case in situations where the notion 
of ‘national security’ is alleged as the justification for that interference by 
State authorities.155    
Supranational cooperation in criminal justice investigations and proceedings 
has been developed between the EU and third countries in international 
treaties which have taken the shape of Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) 
agreements. This has been the case most notably for the purposes of this 
study in relation to the EU-US Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance, which 
has been already introduced above (section 3.2.1).156  
                                                   
153 P. Aalto et al. (2014), “Article 47 – Right to an Effective Remedy and to a Fair 
Trial”, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner and A. Ward (eds), The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. 1208. 
154 Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651. 
155 D. Bigo et al. (2014), “National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation and 
Before the Courts: Exploring the Challenges”, CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe 
Series, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.  
156 See section 2.1 of this Study on mediated access model. 
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Furthermore, the EU has striven to develop during the last 15 years a 
European Criminal Justice Area.157 This political goal has been based on 
the presumption of mutual trust between EU Member States and their 
authorities, as well as the principle of mutual recognition of criminal justice 
decisions. One of the latest steps forward in the domain of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters at EU level has been the adoption of the 
European Investigation Order in 2014 (section 3.2.2). 
3.3.1. EU-US Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance  
3.3.1.1. Exchange of Personal Data 
A key provision in the EU-US Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (EU-US 
MLA) is Article 4, which allows for the exchange of a wide range of everyday 
information about financial transactions.158 As the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Union has noted, the terms of Article 4 
“remain broad and the provision as drafted could extend to a wide 
range of information about legitimate everyday transactions of, as 
the [UK] Government admitted, ‘innocent third parties’.”159  
3.3.1.2. Assistance to administrative authorities 
Another important provision of the EU-US MLA is Article 8. It aims at 
extending its scope by allowing mutual legal assistance to administrative 
authorities. According to Article 8(1), mutual legal assistance must also 
be afforded to a national administrative authority, investigating 
conduct with a view to a criminal prosecution of the conduct, or referral of 
the conduct to criminal investigation or prosecution authorities, pursuant to 
its specific administrative or regulatory authority to undertake such 
investigation. Mutual legal assistance may also be afforded to other 
                                                   
157  V. Mitsilegas (2012), “The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice from 
Amsterdam to Lisbon. Challenges of Implementation, Constitutionality and 
Fundamental Rights”, General Report, in J. Laffranque (ed.), The Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, Including Information Society Issues. Reports of the XXV FIDE 
Congress, Tallinn, Vol. 3, pp. 21-142. V. Mitsilegas (2012), “The Limits of Mutual 
Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. From Automatic Inter-
state Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual”, Yearbook of European 
Law 2012, Vol. 31, pp. 319-372. 
158 Article 4(1) reads as follows: “(a) Upon request of the requesting State, the 
requested State shall, in accordance with the terms of this Article, promptly 
ascertain if the banks located in its territory possess information on whether an 
identified natural or legal person suspected of or charged with a criminal offence is 
the holder of a bank account or accounts. The requested State shall promptly 
communicate the results of its enquiries to the requesting State. (b) The actions 
described in subparagraph (a) may also be taken for the purpose of identifying: (i) 
information regarding natural or legal persons convicted of or otherwise involved 
in a criminal offence; (ii) information in the possession of non-bank financial 
institutions; or (iii) financial transactions unrelated to accounts.” The Agreement 
also contains provisions on the establishment of joint investigative teams (Article 
5) and videoconference arrangements (Article 6). 
159 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, EU-US Agreements 
on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance, 38th Report, session 2002-03, HL 
Paper 153, para. 31. 
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administrative authorities under such circumstances. Assistance must not 
be available for matters in which the administrative authority anticipates 
that no prosecution or referral, as applicable, will take place.  
According to the Explanatory note to the Agreement, the first sentence of 
Article 8(1) imposes an obligation to afford mutual legal assistance to 
requesting US federal administrative authorities and to requesting national 
administrative authorities of EU Member States. Under the second sentence 
of that paragraph mutual legal assistance may also be made available to 
other, that is, non-federal or local, administrative authorities. The scope 
of assistance is therefore very broad. It appears to be inconsistent with 
the tight demarcation of the authorities allowed to operate mutual 
recognition in criminal matters under EU law. 
3.3.1.3. Privacy and Data Protection 
In an effort to address concerns with regard to the adverse impact that its 
provisions may have on EU privacy and data protection standards, the EU-
US Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement contains a specific provision, Article 
9, entitled “Limitations on use to protect personal and other data”.  
The wording of Article 9 has done little, however, to address these 
concerns. Article 9(1) sets out the purpose of the use of information 
obtained in very broad terms: the requesting State may use any evidence 
or information obtained from the requested State for the purpose of criminal 
investigations and proceedings; for preventing an immediate and serious 
threat to its public security; for its non-criminal judicial or administrative 
proceedings directly related to investigations or proceedings set forth in 
subparagraph (a), or for which mutual legal assistance was rendered under 
Article 8; for any other purpose, if the information or evidence has been 
made public within the framework of proceedings for which they were 
transmitted, or in any of the situations described in subparagraphs (a), (b) 
and (c); and for any other purpose, only with the prior consent of the 
requested State. The purpose here is so wide that it is questionable 
whether it meets the fundamental EU data protection principle of 
purpose limitation. 
Moreover, and as the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Union has also underlined, no reference is made to specific data protection 
instruments such as Convention 108, the Data Protection Directive and the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.160 Data protection is weakened further 
by Article 9(4), according to which a requested State may apply the use 
limitation provision of an applicable bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty 
in lieu of Article 9 of the Agreement, where doing so will result in less 
restriction on the use of information and evidence than provided for in this 
Article. 
This already limited data protection framework is weakened further by 
Article 9(2). While its first part (Article 9(2)(a)) allows States to impose 
additional conditions in order to comply with a request, its second part 
(Article 9(2)(b)) states that generic restrictions with respect to the 
legal standards of the requesting State for processing personal data 
                                                   
160 House of Lords, para. 35. 
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may not be imposed by the requested State as a condition under 
subparagraph (a) to providing evidence or information.  
This is an attempt to ensure that concerns with regard to EU data protection 
law will not constitute a barrier to cooperation under the Mutual Legal 
Assistance Agreement. In order to ensure that full cooperation takes place 
notwithstanding these concerns, the Explanatory Note to the Agreement 
states: 
Article 9(2)(b) is meant to ensure that refusal of assistance on data 
protection grounds may be invoked only in exceptional cases…A 
broad, categorical, or systematic application of data protection 
principles by the requested State to refuse cooperation is therefore 
precluded. Thus, the fact the requesting and requested States have 
different systems of protecting the privacy of data (such as that the 
requesting State does not have the equivalent of a specialised data 
protection authority) or have different means of protecting personal 
data (such as that the requesting State uses means other than the 
process of deletion to protect the privacy or the accuracy of the 
personal data received by law enforcement authorities), may as such 
not be imposed as additional conditions under Article 9(2a). 
3.3.1.4 Benchmarks and Relation to Bilateral Agreements 
Article 3 of the EU-US MLA aims to clarify the relationship between the EU 
and its Member States as regards the application of the Agreement. 
Uncertainty with regard to the external action powers of the EU under the 
old ‘Third Pillar’ (comprising Justice and Home Affairs cooperation under the 
Maastricht Treaty) resulted in an emphasis on the maintenance or 
establishment of bilateral relations between EU Member States and 
the US.  
Article 3(1) clarifies that the EU-US Agreement supplements, and does not 
replace, bilateral agreements in the field. The main innovations brought 
about by the Agreement (provisions on the identification of bank 
information, joint investigation teams, videoconferencing, expedited 
requests and assistance to administrative authorities) apply in addition to 
any authority already provided under bilateral treaty provisions (Article 
3(1)(a)-(e), respectively), while the data protection provisions apply in 
place, or in the absence, of bilateral treaty provisions (Article 3(1)(f)) and 
the provisions on confidentiality in the absence of bilateral provisions 
(Article 3(1)(g)).  
The bilateral dimension was also emphasised by the requirement, in 
addition to the signature of the Agreement by the EU, for the exchange of 
written instruments between each EU Member State and the US, 
acknowledging the application of their bilateral agreements in the light of 
the provisions of the EU-US Agreements (Article 3(2)). This emphasis on 
the bilateral dimension does not negate, however, the EU law 
dimension of the obligations EU Member States have undertaken 
under this Agreement.  
While the EU-US MLA supplements bilateral agreements, the latter do not 
operate in isolation from EU law. The EU law dimension is visible throughout 
the MLA Agreement: the Union will coordinate Member State actions 
regarding their exchange of written instruments with the US setting out the 
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application of their relevant bilateral agreements;161 it will ensure that the 
provisions of the EU agreements are applied to bilateral MLA Treaties 
between Member States and the US;162 it will ensure that the provisions of 
the EU-US MLA are applied in the absence of a bilateral treaty;163 and it will 
be engaged in consultation and review processes with the US regarding the 
content of the agreements.164 Moreover, the standards set out by the 
EU-US Agreement will constitute a benchmark for the conclusion of 
future bilateral agreements in the field between Member States and the 
US (Article 14).  
Underpinning Member States’ bilateral relations with the US by EU law is 
further strengthened by the non-derogation clause of Article 13. According 
to this provision the Agreement is without prejudice to the invocation by 
the requested State of grounds for refusal of assistance available 
pursuant to a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty, or, in the absence of 
a treaty, its applicable legal principles, including where execution of the 
request would prejudice its sovereignty, security, ordre public or other 
essential interests.  
Non-compliance with fundamental rights might constitute such a ground for 
refusal, especially after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The 
Agreement should be interpreted consistently with the 
requirements of EU constitutional and human rights law, including in 
particular the provisions laid out above in the scope of the EU Charter as 
well as consistently with the Directive on the European Investigation Order 
(see section 3.2.2 below).  
Cooperation between Member States and the US must comply with these 
benchmarks and comply fully with EU law. The end of the transitional period 
(since December 2014) regarding the role of EU institutions (and the 
liberalisation of the enforcement powers enjoyed by the European 
Commission and the Luxembourg Court of Justice) in relation to EU criminal 
justice and police cooperation law further confirms that the EU-US 
Agreement must be treated as a full, supranational EU 
agreement.165 
                                                   
161 Decision concerning the signature of the agreements, Article 2(2). 
162 Article 3(1). 
163 Article 3(3)(a). 
164 Article 11 of the Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement. Moreover, note that it is 
the Council on behalf of the EU which will decide on the extension of the territorial 
scope of the agreement (Article 3 of the Decision concerning the signature of the 
agreements). 
165 For an assessment of the end of the Transitional Period refer to V. Mitsilegas et 
al. (2014), “The End of the Transitional Period for Police and Criminal Justice 
Measures Adopted before the Lisbon Treaty: Who Monitors Trust in the European 
Justice Area?”, CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe Series, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Brussels.  
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3.3.2. The European Investigation Order  
The Directive on the European Investigation Order (EIO)166 regulates the 
exchange of evidence between EU Member States in the field of 
criminal justice. The Directive applies the principle of mutual recognition 
in the field of evidence, and is the first major instrument on mutual 
recognition adopted after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.167  
The Directive is of major importance with regard to its applicability. It will 
replace, as of 22 May 2017, the corresponding provisions applicable 
between Member States bound by it of the Council of Europe Mutual Legal 
Assistance and its protocols, the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement and the EU Mutual Legal Assistance Convention and its 
Protocol.168 The Directive will also replace the Framework Decision on the 
European Evidence Warrant, 169  and the relevant provisions of the 
Framework Decision on the mutual recognition of freezing orders.170  
In this manner, the EIO Directive will become the sole legal instrument 
regulating the exchange of evidence and mutual legal assistance 
between EU Member States. The transposition deadline for Member 
States is also 22 May 2017.171  
The Directive is divided into two main parts: the first part (Chapters I-III) 
introduces the rules underpinning the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition in the field of exchange of criminal evidence; the second part 
(Chapters IV-VI) consists of a number of specific procedural provisions 
covering aspects of the conduct of investigations (such as provisions on 
temporary transfer of evidence, hearing by videoconference, covert 
investigations and the interception of telecommunications). 
An EIO is defined as a judicial decision which has been issued or validated 
by a judicial authority of a Member State (the issuing State) to have one or 
several specific investigative measures carried out in another Member State 
(the executing State) to obtain evidence in accordance with the Directive.172 
It may also be issued for obtaining evidence that is already in the 
possession of the competent authorities of the executing State. 173  Its 
                                                   
166 Directive 2014/41/EU regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal 
matters, OJ L130, 1.5.2014, p. 1. 
167 On the application of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters, see 
V. Mitsilegas (2006), “The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in 
Criminal Matters in the EU”, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 43, pp. 1277-1311; 
and V. Mitsilegas (2009), EU Criminal Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, chapter 3. 
168 Article 34(1). 
169 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA on the European evidence warrant 
for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in 
criminal matters, OJ L350, 30.12.2008, p.72. 
170 Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 July 2003 on the execution in 
the European Union of orders freezing property or evidence, OJ L196, 2.8.2003, p. 
45, Article 34(2). 
171 Article 36(1). 
172 Article 1(1) first indent. 
173 Article 1(1) second indent. 
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issuing may be requested by a suspected or accused person, or by a lawyer 
on his behalf, within the framework of applicable defence rights in 
conformity with national criminal procedure.174 It may be issued: 
(a) With respect to criminal proceedings that are brought by, or that 
may be brought before, a judicial authority in respect of a criminal 
offence under the national law of the issuing State; 
(b) In proceedings brought by administrative authorities in respect 
of acts which are punishable under the national law of the issuing 
State by virtue of being infringements of the rules of law and where 
the decision may give rise to proceedings before a court having 
jurisdiction, in particular, in criminal matters;  
(c) In proceedings brought by judicial authorities in respect of acts 
which are punishable under the national law of the issuing State by 
virtue of being infringements of the rules of law, and, where the 
decision may give rise to proceedings before a court having 
jurisdiction, in  particular, in criminal matters; and 
(d) In connection with proceedings referred to in points (a), (b) and 
(c) which relate to offences or infringements for which a legal person 
may be held liable or punished in the issuing State.175  
The term “court having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters” 
has been granted an autonomous meaning by the CJEU for the purposes of 
the application of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters. As 
mentioned in section 2 above, the Treaties do not provide a definition of 
what is a court for the purposes of EU law. The Luxembourg Court of Justice 
has examined the definition of this term in the case of Baláz.176 It did so 
within the meaning of Article 1(a)(iii) of the Framework Decision on the 
mutual recognition of financial penalties.177  
The first step was to define the term “court” contained in Article 1(a)(iii) 
of the Framework Decision. The Court of Justice did so by relying on the 
criteria it had previously developed for determining whether a referring 
body is a “court or tribunal” for the purposes of Article 267 TFEU. To that 
end, the Court reiterated the need to take into account a number of factors, 
such as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, 
whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, 
whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent.178 
The second step was to define the concept of “having jurisdiction in 
criminal matters”. The Court found that in order to ensure that the 
Framework Decision is effective, it is appropriate to rely on an interpretation 
of the words “having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters” in which 
the classification of offences by the Member States is not conclusive.179 To 
that end, the court having jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1(a)(iii) 
                                                   
174 Article 1(3). 
175 Article 4. 
176 CJEU, C-60/12, Baláz, 14 November 2013. 
177 Reference FD financial penalties. 
178 Ibid., para. 32. 
179 Ibid., para. 35. 
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of the Framework Decision must apply a procedure which satisfies the 
essential characteristics of criminal procedure, without, however, it being 
necessary for that court to have jurisdiction in criminal matters alone.180 In 
order to determine whether a court can be regarded as a court having 
jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters, within the meaning of the 
Framework Decision, an overall assessment of a number of objective factors 
that characterise that body and its operation has to be carried out.181  
The Directive states expressly that Member States must execute the 
EIO on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition.182 In principle, 
the executing authority must recognise an EIO without any further 
formality being required, and ensure its execution, in the same way and 
under the same modalities as if the investigative measure concerned had 
been ordered by an authority of the executing State.183  
The decision on the recognition or execution must be taken and the 
investigative measure must be carried out with the same celerity and 
priority as for a similar domestic case and, in any case, within the time 
limits provided in the Directive. 184  The decision on the recognition or 
execution of a EIO must be taken in principle no later than 30 days from 
the receipt of the Order by the competent executing authority.185  The 
deadline for the executing authority to carry out the investigative measures 
covered by the order is a maximum of 90 days.186 Both deadlines can be 
extended by a maximum of 30 days if recognition or execution is not 
practicable within the time limit set out in a specific case.187 
The Directive thus introduces a system of mutual recognition based 
on a minimum of formality, and speed. However, there are a number 
of safeguards set out in the Directive which temper the automaticity in the 
execution of EIOs. The considerable legal diversity as regards national 
legislation on evidence, coupled with the potentially far-reaching 
consequences of mutual recognition in the field of evidence for national 
constitutional traditions and the protection of fundamental rights, have led 
to the inclusion in the text of the Directive of a number of provisions 
aiming to prevent automatic mutual recognition. These provisions 
concern in particular: the possibility of legal adaptation in the execution of 
an EIO; the introduction of a proportionality test; and the introduction of a 
specific ground for refusal to execute on fundamental rights grounds. 
                                                   
180 Ibid., para. 36. 
181 Ibid., para. 37. For an analysis, see V. Mitsilegas (forthcoming), “Managing 
Legal Diversity in Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice: The Role of Autonomous 
Concepts”, in R. Colson and S. Field (eds), EU Criminal Justice and the Challenges 
of Legal Diversity. Towards A Socio-Legal Approach to EU Criminal Policy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
182 Article 1(2). 
183 Article 9(1). 
184 Article 12(1). 
185 Article 12 (3). 
186 Article 12(4). 
187 Article 12(5). 
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3.3.2.1. Legal Adaptation 
The Directive provides a series of safeguards with regard to the respect 
of the legal and constitutional system of the executing Member 
State. Most notably:  
 the executing authority must comply with the formalities and 
procedures expressly indicated by the issuing authority provided that 
these are not contrary to the fundamental principles of law of the 
executing State;188  
 the executing authority must have recourse to an investigative 
measure other than that provided for in the Order where the 
investigative measure does not exist under the law of the executing 
State or the investigative measure would not be available in a similar 
domestic case;189  
 the executing authority may also have recourse to an investigative 
measure other than that indicated in the European Investigation 
Order where the investigative measure selected by the executing 
authority would achieve the same result by less intrusive means;190 
and  
 the executing authority may refuse to recognise and execute an EIO 
where the requirement of the respect of dual criminality has not been 
met for certain categories of offences;191 and the executing authority 
may refuse to recognise and execute an EIO when the latter has been 
issued in proceedings brought by administrative or judicial 
authorities referred to in Article 4(b) and (c) of the Directive and the 
investigative measure would not be authorised under the law of the 
executing State in a similar domestic case.192  
The Directive further calls for the applicability of legal remedies 
equivalent to those applicable in a similar domestic case to the 
investigative measures indicated in the EIO.193  
In addition to the safeguards provided in relation to the law of the executing 
Member State, the Directive has included a key safeguard as regards 
the integrity of the law of the issuing State. The Directive states clearly 
that the issuing authority may only issue an EIO where the investigative 
measures indicated therein could have been ordered under the same 
conditions in a similar domestic case.194 This provision has been included 
to avoid instances where Member States use the EIO to ‘fish’ for 
evidence and obtain evidence abroad which they are not able to obtain 
under their own domestic legal and constitutional procedures. 
                                                   
188 Article 9(2). 
189 Article 10(1), but see the exceptions in Article 10(2). 
190 Article 10(3). 
191 Article 11(1)(g). 
192 Article 11(1)(c). 
193 See Article 14(1), and see para. 4 on time limits and para. 6 on suspensive 
effect. 
194 Article 6(1)(b). 
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3.3.2.2. Proportionality 
A debate which has arisen in the context of the implementation of the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)195 concerns the 
question of whether the operation of mutual recognition in criminal 
matters should be subject to a proportionality test. And, if so, 
whether this test should be conducted by the issuing or by the executing 
authority, or by both.  
Proportionality concerns have arisen from allegations that national 
authorities have been issuing EAWs for trivial offences.196 This was deemed 
to have an adverse effect on the efficiency of the domestic criminal justice 
system of the executing Member State, as the system was inundated with 
large numbers of requests resulting in high costs and delays, as well as an 
adverse effect on the fundamental rights of affected individuals.197 
The use of the proportionality test in EAW proceedings was examined by 
Advocate General (AG) Sharpston in her Opinion in Radu.198 While finding 
that the issue was not of direct relevance to that case, the AG discussed 
the tension between Warrants issued for perceived trivial offences on the 
one hand and the principle of proportionality on the other as follows: 
I would add one thing. At the hearing, counsel for Germany used the 
example of a stolen goose. If that Member State were asked to 
execute a European arrest warrant in respect of that crime where 
the sentence passed in the issuing Member State was one of six 
years, she thought that execution of the warrant would be refused. 
She considered that such a refusal would be justifiable on the basis 
of the doctrine of proportionality and referred the Court to Article 
49(3) of the Charter, according to which ‘the severity of penalties 
must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence’. This Court has 
yet to rule on the interpretation of that article. In the context of the 
Convention, the Court of Human Rights has held that while, in 
principle, matters of appropriate sentencing largely fall outside the 
scope of the Convention, a sentence which is ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ could amount to ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 
but that it is only on ‘rare and unique occasions’ that the test will be 
met. It would be interesting to speculate as to the interpretation to 
be given to Article 49(3) of the Charter having regard to the 
interpretation given by the Court of Human Rights of the provisions 
of Article 3 of the Convention.199 
                                                   
195 Council of the EU (2002), Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European 
arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, 
2002/584/JHA, Official Journal L 190, 18.7.2002. 
196 For a detailed examination see S. Carrera et al. (2013), “Europe’s Most Wanted? 
Recalibrating Trust in the European Arrest Warrant System”, CEPS Liberty and 
Security in Europe Series, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.  
197  For the debate in the UK, see Sir Scott Baker, Extradition Review; Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, The Human Rights Implications of UK Extradition 
Policy, Fifteenth Report, session 2010-12, pp. 40-3. 
198 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 18 October 2012, Case 
C-396/11 Radu. 
199 Para. 103. 
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The CJEU did not engage with the proportionality argument in Radu. 
However, the issue has surfaced in domestic law, with the United Kingdom 
recently amending the Extradition Act 2003 to expressly include 
proportionality as a ground for refusal to recognise and execute a EAW.200  
The EU legislator has followed a different approach in the EIO Directive, by 
introducing a proportionality test but reserving it for the issuing 
authority. According to Article 6(1)(a) of the Directive, the issuing 
authority may only issue an EIO where the issuing of the latter is 
necessary and proportionate. This provision, coupled with the safeguard 
mentioned above that the issuing authority may only issue an Order where 
the investigative measures indicated in the EIO could have been ordered 
under the same conditions in a similar domestic case (Article 6(1)(b)) 
places clear limits on the powers of issuing authorities to abuse the EIO 
system. 
3.3.2.3. Fundamental Rights 
A central question in the development of the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition in criminal matters has been whether the relevant 
instruments should include an express ground for refusal to 
recognise and execute a judicial decision on fundamental rights 
grounds.  
In the pre-Lisbon Treaty, EU Third Pillar legal framework on mutual 
recognition in judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the answer to this 
question has been negative. While mutual recognition instruments 
contained references to the respect of fundamental rights, they did not 
include a specific ground for refusal in this regard. It was felt that 
including a fundamental rights ground for refusal would limit unduly mutual 
recognition and would disregard the mutual trust underpinning the system 
of mutual recognition among EU Member States, all signatories to the ECHR 
and bound by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
The EIO Directive marks a remarkable shift in this regard. While it 
contains a general clause proclaiming respect for fundamental rights,201 the 
Directive also contains for the first time an express ground for 
refusal on fundamental rights grounds. According to Article 11(1)(f) of 
the Directive, the executing authority may refuse to recognise or execute 
an EIO where there are substantial grounds to believe that the execution of 
the investigative measure indicated in the Order would be incompatible with 
the executing State’s obligations in accordance with Article 6 TEU and the 
Charter. This is a major legal development, which sets out expressly 
the fundamental rights parameters of the operation of the mutual 
recognition principle. 
                                                   
200 In March 2014, section 157 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 
2014, introduced proportionality as a ground for refusing to surrender an individual 
in section 21A of the Extradition Act 2003. 
201 According to Article 1(4), the Directive will not have the effect of modifying the 
obligation to respect the fundamental rights and legal principles as enshrined in 
Article 6 of the TEU, including the rights of the defence of persons subject to 
criminal proceedings, and any obligations incumbent on judicial authorities in this 
respect will remain unaffected. 
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The creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) 
within the Union is based on mutual confidence and a presumption 
of compliance by other Member States with Union law and, in 
particular, with fundamental rights. However, that presumption is 
rebuttable.  
Consequently, if there are substantial grounds for believing that the 
execution of an investigative measure indicated in the EIO would result in 
a breach of a fundamental right of the person concerned and that the 
executing State would disregard its obligations concerning the protection of 
fundamental rights recognised in the EU Charter, the execution of the EIO 
should be refused.202 This provision is important in confirming that the 
presumption that all EU Member States comply with fundamental 
rights at all instances is rebuttable, and in thus setting limits to blind 
mutual trust among States by stressing the requirement for executing 
authorities to examine the impact of the execution of the EIO on the 
affected individual.203 
3.3.2.4. The European Investigation Order as a Benchmark for 
External Action 
The EIO Directive is a significant legal development in the field of judicial 
cooperation between EU Member States and in the field of the development 
of the application of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters 
more broadly. The Directive reflects a constitutional settlement between 
Member States, by setting out clear limits and parameters to the operation 
of mutual recognition.  
As described above, applicable limits take the form of safeguards of 
the internal legal and constitutional order of the executing Member 
State; safeguards of the internal legal and constitutional order of 
the issuing Member States; proportionality safeguards; and 
fundamental rights safeguards. To these provisions should be 
added the judicialisation of mutual legal assistance, as reflected by 
the definition of the authorities competent to participate in the system by 
the Directive and the CJEU. 
The provisions of the EIO Directive constitute significant advances in the 
law of mutual recognition and constitute benchmarks for EU internal 
and external action in the field. Member States are duty-bound to 
comply with the Directive not only when they implement it under domestic 
law, but also in their bilateral dealings with third countries, especially 
in view of the Union’s powers to conclude international agreements in the 
field using Article 82(1) TFEU. The Directive also acts as a benchmark for 
EU external action in the field, something that includes existing 
international agreements such as the EU-US Agreement on Mutual Legal 
Assistance. 
 
                                                   
202 Preamble, Recital (19). 
203 V. Mitsilegas (2012), “The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. From Automatic Inter-state Cooperation to the Slow 
Emergence of the Individual”, Yearbook of European Law 2012, Vol. 31, pp. 319-
372. 
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3.4. Cybercrime 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The EU has exercised legal competence in the domain of cybercrime 
through the adoption of the EU Directive 2013/40 on attacks against 
information systems, which needs to be transposed by EU Member 
States by September 2015. 
 The Directive adopts the key definitions provided by the Council of 
Europe Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, and introduces 
important innovations concerning the use of substantive criminal law 
and the types of criminal offences. 
Concern about cybercrime has been an adjunct to the meteoric 
development of information technologies. As the evolution of 
telecommunications technology has been embraced by individuals and 
businesses around the world, concerns about the protection of the vast 
amounts of data which are transferred has become a preoccupation of 
governments. The EU has had its own legal instrument on cybercrime since 
2013, after the adoption of the EU Directive 2013/40 on attacks 
against information systems. 
This Directive, adopted on 12 August 2013, replaced a Council Framework 
Decision (2005/222/JHA) which the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
made necessary (because of the collapsing of the ‘Pillars’). It entered into 
force 20 days after publication in the Official Journal (14 August 2013) and 
Member States are required to transpose the directive into national law at 
the latest by 4 September 2015. The legal basis is Article 83(1) TFEU. 
The Framework Decision had responded to the objective of improving 
cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities 
through the approximation of rules of Member State criminal law 
relating to attacks against information systems, illegal system interference 
and illegal data interference. Judicial and other competent authorities 
include police and other specialised law enforcement services. It followed 
closely the main lines of the Council of Europe Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime, particularly in adopting the key definitions of the 
convention.204 The EU has not signed or ratified the Council of Europe 
Convention.  
                                                   
204 The objective of the Budapest Convention is threefold: harmonising criminal 
substantive law elements of the offences and connected provisions of cybercrime; 
requiring the provision of domestic criminal procedural law powers necessary for 
the investigation and prosecution of the offences; and establishing a system for 
international cooperation. There are nine offences under the Convention: illegal 
access; illegal interception; data interference; system interference; misuse of 
devices; computer-related forgery; computer-related fraud; offences related to 
child pornography; and offences relating to copyright and related rights. Under the 
procedural law issues contained in the second chapter of the convention, the scope 
is widened. The issues here include any offence committed by means of a computer 
system or the evidence of which is in electronic form. The procedural powers 
include: expedited preservation of stored data; expedited preservation and partial 
disclosure of traffic data; production order; search and seizure of computer data; 
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The Directive retained the main elements of the Framework Decision but 
added some innovations. First, regarding substantive criminal law, it 
provides for penalties regarding the production, sale, procurement for use, 
import or distribution of, or otherwise making available, devices or tools 
used for the commission of the offences. It makes provision for aggravating 
circumstances including large-scale attacks and attacks where by reason of 
the concealment of the real identity of the perpetrator the rightful identity 
owner is prejudiced. A new criminal offence of illegal interception is included 
in the Directive. There is a strengthening of EU criminal justice cooperation 
with additional obligations on providing assistance and the production of 
statistics.  
The criminal offences include illegal access to information systems, illegal 
systems interference and illegal interference. There is an element of 
flexibility regarding the duty to prosecute which allows Member States to 
criminalise only “cases which are not minor”. The exercise of EU legal 
competence in the field of cybercrime through the formal adoption of this 
Directive limits the scope of action by EU Member States in the 
framework of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee 
(T-CY) (see section 4 below). 
                                                   
real-time collection of traffic data; interception of content data. There are 
provisions which deal with jurisdiction. 
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SECTION 4. CHALLENGES TO RULE OF LAW 
AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
KEY FINDINGS 
Third-country access to data outside established legal channels of 
mediated assistance (MLAs) poses four legal and rule-of-law 
challenges: 
First, the jurisdiction challenge:  
It stands in a difficult relationship with the state territorial concept of 
jurisdiction. In criminal justice the notion of jurisdiction requires the 
conclusion of international agreements (MLAs) to handle the conflicts 
of law. Third-country unmediated access to data unlawfully bypasses 
existing legally binding channels. The resulting picture is one of legal 
insecurity and mistrust. 
The European concept of jurisdiction in the field of human rights is 
foreign in the US. For all EU Member States the final word on their 
legal obligations is not in their constitutions. They must comply with 
the ECHR and supranational set of rule-of-law and fundamental rights 
provisions in the EU legal system. 
Second, the lawfulness and ‘venue-shopping’ challenge: 
These practices fail to pass the lawfulness test. Some security actors 
are using regional fora (venue shopping) to agree on new rules which 
would put at risk EU standards by legalising unilateral law 
enforcement access by third countries to data held by private sector 
actors.  
Discussions such as those in the CoE on cybercrime and transborder 
access to electronic data pose serious challenges from the perspective 
of EU law. 
Third, the challenge of alleged inefficiency: 
Arguments alleging that MLA agreement models are inefficient are not 
substantiated by the available evidence or by statistics on their uses 
and practical operability. 
Current obstacles affecting MLA processes can be overcome by 
bilateral case consultations, day-to-day contacts, stronger political 
commitments, more effective use of existing tools and sound 
financial, technological and human resources investment in their 
implementation. 
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Fourth, the privacy and data protection challenge: 
Third-country access to data outside MLA agreements is contrary to 
EU data protection acquis. There are major dissimilarities between the 
EU and the US as regards data protection, not least the lack of 
effective judicial protection provided to EU citizens in US territory for 
privacy violations. This makes it difficult for EU institutions and 
Member States to ensure the safeguarding of EU fundamental rights 
and the benchmarks developed by the CJEU in the Digital Rights 
Ireland ruling in transatlantic operating frameworks of cooperation in 
the domains of law enforcement and criminal justice.  
What are the legal and rule-of-law challenges raised by unmediated models 
of access to data by third-country authorities? This section examines the 
nature and scope of these challenges. Particular attention is first paid to the 
negative consequences of foreign authorities’ access to data held by private 
companies under EU jurisdiction from the perspective of jurisdiction, 
territoriality and conflicts of law (section 4.1). A second issue of concern 
relates to lawfulness and venue shopping, in particular the inherent 
tensions raised between the promotion of unmediated models in regional 
venues such as the Council of Europe and the fact that the EU has already 
exercised legal competence in the same domains (section 4.2). A third 
challenge relates to claims of ineffectiveness of MLA mediated models of 
access to data. Section 4.3 critically reviews those claims in light of existing 
evidence and tests their adequacy and limitations. Finally, section 4.4 points 
out the privacy and data protection challenges emerging from unmediated 
practices from the perspective of EU data protection acquis.  
4.1. Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction as a legal term means the reach of the law of one State over 
acts and individuals and thus entails responsibility for regulation. It is a way 
of speaking about how and over whom what law applies.205 Jurisdiction 
is currently first and foremost a State territorial concept, and there is 
general consensus on the principle that within the territory of a sovereign 
State, the laws of that State apply.206  
As various legal actors become involved in cross-border activities, the 
question of jurisdiction becomes increasingly complex. In any case, 
jurisdiction is not a single legal concept nor does it have a single coherent 
meaning across sovereign States. It may be interpreted very differently 
depending on the State involved (including as interpreted by the national 
courts). Jurisdiction also varies dramatically depending on the field of law 
under consideration.  
                                                   
205  J.A. Colangelo (2014), “What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?”, Cornell Law 
Review, 99, p. 121. 
206 The best known exception to the territorial jurisdiction rule is that contained in 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, which provides for the 
inviolability of embassy premises and the protection of accredited diplomats from 
national jurisdiction in the State where they are posted. 
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In respect of transnational law enforcement access to data, two very 
different fields of jurisdiction come into contact with one another: 
jurisdiction in criminal law and jurisdiction in human rights and EU 
fundamental rights law. The first thing to note is that there are wide 
divergences between EU Member States among themselves,207 let alone 
between EU States and the US, on the meaning and application of 
jurisdiction in criminal justice.208  
In the domain of criminal justice, the first principle is that States may seek 
to exercise jurisdiction but they may or may not be successful depending 
on what approach the other State(s) involved takes. In the absence of 
international agreements on criminal justice there is no certainty that 
States will agree to jurisdictional claims of other States which require the 
first State to do or refrain from doing something. 
Where the problem relates to “evidence”, the country seeking to 
prosecute will need to have an agreement on mutual legal 
assistance (MLA) with the country where the evidence needs to be 
collected. Otherwise, any effort by the police in the second country to 
collect the evidence may be illegal as unrelated to the prosecution of 
criminal offences in the territory. 
Neither police nor prosecutors nor courts can act to assist a prosecution 
elsewhere unless permitted by law. Though rare, it does happen that more 
than one country wants to prosecute the same person (often for the same 
offence). Once again there will need to be rules and agreements on how 
this should happen and on the basis of which principles – for instance, the 
UK and the US have an agreement on handling concurrent jurisdiction.  
Here, however, a competing system of jurisdiction enters the field – that of 
European human rights and EU fundamental rights law. An illustrative 
example relates to the principle of ne bis in idem, which is inscribed in both 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 4 Protocol 7)209 and the 
EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 50).210 This competing system 
of jurisdiction is particularly compelling in the EU and is driven by 
completely different principles and according to entirely separate rules from 
criminal justice competence. 
The European concept of jurisdiction in the area of human 
rights/fundamental rights is rather foreign to US jurists and law 
enforcement authorities. It has no US counterpart as it is an expression 
of a very strong supranational normative and legally constraining 
framework within which States are obliged to act or refrain from acting.  
While as in the US, all EU and Council of Europe States have constitutions, 
these constitutions are not the final word on their ‘constitutional’ 
                                                   
207  L. Reydams (2000), “Universal Criminal Jurisdiction: The Belgian State of 
Affairs", Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 11. No. 2. 
208 P. Alldridge (2012), “UK Bribery Act: The Caffeinated Younger Sibling of the 
FCPA”, Ohio St. LJ, 73, p. 1181. 
209 An example of the principle at work can be found in PIRTTIMÄKI v. FINLAND 20 
May 2014 European Court of Human Rights.  
210 For an example of the principle at work in the EU context see Spasic C-129/14 
PPU, 27 May 2014. 
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obligations. They must also comply with both the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Article 6 TEU) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights if 
they are EU Member States (Article 6 TEU). The European Convention on 
Human Rights is interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights based 
in Strasbourg and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is interpreted by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union based in Luxembourg.  
By and large the two courts try to avoid conflict.211 So far, the CJEU has not 
had to delve into the intricacies of jurisdiction beyond the EU – though it 
has been very much taken up with intra-EU jurisdiction issues. On the other 
hand, the ECtHR has developed a very dynamic interpretation of the 
jurisdiction of the ECHR over the past 20 years.  
For the purposes of this study, what is critical in this jurisprudence is the 
fact that the ECHR right to respect for privacy (Article 8) is governed 
by a completely different set of rules on jurisdiction than criminal 
law (regional, national or international). Agreements among States on 
jurisdiction in criminal matters cannot constrain the application of the 
Article 8 right to respect for privacy on actors within Council of Europe 
States. It is just not possible to modify European human rights 
obligations through bilateral or multilateral agreements. Only an 
amendment to the ECHR itself can have that effect. 
Jurisdiction for the purposes of the ECHR is very wide indeed and is 
integrally connected with the principle of State control. So long as a State 
is in control of the territory or actions which take place, it is likely also to 
have jurisdiction over them for the purposes of determining human rights 
responsibility. The State is equally responsible for human rights violations 
by virtue of its failure to regulate the activities of private sector actors under 
its jurisdiction.212 
The fact that different jurisdictions offer different types and degrees of 
privacy protection on the web only complicates matters. Some providers 
have been publicising the location of their services in a strong data 
protection jurisdiction in order to attract customers concerned about their 
privacy.213 Others suggest that their use of the web is more limited in 
territorial scope. As the research of Binns et al.214 indicates, as regards 
available data for the UK only, 90% of data collection was not transferred 
outside the European Economic Area. As regards jurisdiction, the duty to 
ensure respect for privacy in accordance with Article 8 ECHR and 
                                                   
211 C. Costello (2006), “The Bosphorus ruling of the European Court of Human 
Rights: Fundamental rights and blurred boundaries in Europe”, Human Rights Law 
Review, 6.1, pp. 87-130. 
212 In Tatar v. Romania, 27 January 2009, the ECtHR found the State in violation 
of Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) as a result of the actions 
of a private company. The ECtHR held that the authorities had failed in their duty 
to assess, to a satisfactory degree, the risk that the company’s activities might 
entail, and to take suitable measures in order to protect the rights of those 
concerned. 
213 R. D. Binns, D. Millard, and L. Harris (2014), “Data havens, or privacy sans 
frontières?: a study of international personal data transfers”, Proceedings of the 
2014 ACM Conference on Web Science, ACM. 
214 Ibid. 
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Article 7 Charter rests with the State Parties (47 of the Council of 
Europe and 28 of the European Union).  
If these States allow arbitrary or unjustified interference with individuals’ 
privacy either through a failure to legislate or control adequately the 
activities of companies on their territory, then they risk being in violation 
of Article 8 ECHR and Article 7 Charter. If State authorities actively 
engage in measures which interfere with the right to respect for privacy 
whether on their own territory or in places where they exercise control even 
temporarily (e.g. cables in international waters), then the violation will be 
within their jurisdiction and they will need to justify the interference to the 
usual high standard which the ECtHR and CJEU apply.215 
The central challenge for the EU in light of the described competing models 
of transnational law enforcement access to data is, undoubtedly, to 
preserve the rule of law in unmediated access to data practices. 
‘Unmediated’ access practices and, in particular, those allowing for 
‘unmediated’ access by authorities from countries that are not members of 
the Council of Europe, directly affect the possibility for individuals to seek 
judicial remedies in relation to compliance with their fundamental rights.  
Moreover, even though, in principle, transnational law enforcement access 
to data concerns specific data requests, as opposed to mass surveillance, 
the line between a specific request of data and mass surveillance 
might be difficult to determine in practice. In this sense, bulk data 
requests (for instance, referring generally to all the emails of the users of 
some Internet services) can affect large quantities of email accounts and 
users. 
It becomes thus crucial to strictly circumscribe the possibility for any 
‘unmediated’ access to data from taking place, especially to the 
benefit of a third country such as the US, which is not only not a member 
of the Council of Europe but has also not ratified the Council of Europe’s 
Convention 108. This, however, can be rendered especially difficult by the 
activities of EU Member States outside the EU framework – bilaterally or 
through the Council of Europe. It is then particularly important to take into 
account the competence of the EU in these matters.  
Unmediated access by US authorities to data controlled by a private 
company falling under EU jurisdiction constitutes a fundamental challenge 
to both the notion of jurisdiction in criminal law and in human rights and 
EU fundamental rights law. It directly and transparently bypasses the use 
the existing legally binding channels foreseen in the scope of EU-US MLA 
agreements.  
By doing so the required ‘consent’ by the requested EU Member 
States (and their designated central authority, usually the Ministry of 
Justice) and the supervision by independent judicial authorities are 
circumvented. The resulting picture is one where conflicts of law 
emerge and legal uncertainty, mistrust and insecurity for the parties 
involved take over.  
                                                   
215 Copeland v. UK 3 April 2007. Just on this point it is worth recalling that the right 
to respect for privacy applies equally to emails and letters. 
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4.2. Lawfulness and Venue Shopping  
The legal instruments analysed in section 3 above provide a transparent 
picture of the ways in which the EU has progressively exercised and 
extended competence over fields with direct relevance when assessing 
third-country access to data for law enforcement purposes. Some of these 
instruments provide clear benchmarks and standards which delimit the 
discretion and room for manoeuvre of EU Member States and law 
enforcement/criminal justice authorities’ access to electronic data for 
purposes of fighting criminality. 
EU institutions have sometimes publicly expressed a clear position on these 
matters. A 2014 letter from former Commissioner for Justice Viviane 
Reding,216 in response to parliamentary questions posed by the MEP Sophie 
in ‘t Veld, expressed the European Commission’s concerns over the 
extraterritorial application of foreign laws which could be in breach 
of international law, and over companies bound by EU data 
protection law ‘caught in the middle’ of a conflict of laws. The letter 
also stated that it had raised this issue with the US government on a 
number of occasions and that it  
…remains of the view that where governments need to request 
personal data held by private companies and located in the EU, 
requests should not be directly addressed to the companies but 
should proceed via agreed formal channels of co-operation 
between public authorities, such as the mutual legal 
assistance agreements or sectorial EU-US agreements 
authorising such transfers. In the context of the negotiations on 
the umbrella agreement on data protection in the area of law 
enforcement and judicial cooperation, the Commission has asked the 
US to undertake commitments in that regard, in order to avoid these 
potential conflicts of laws. In parallel, the EU institutions should 
continue working towards the swift adoption of the EU data 
protection reform, in order to ensure that personal data is effectively 
and comprehensively protected [emphasis added]. 
The new Commissioner for Justice, Věra Jourová, replied also in 2014 to a 
question introduced by the MEP Carlos Coelho, 217  who inquired, first, 
whether the European Commission considered that enforcement of this 
order constitutes a breach of the current EU legal framework on data 
protection and/or a breach of the fundamental right to privacy, and, second, 
whether the Commission was planning to intervene in any way. In answer 
to these questions, Commissioner Jourová stated: 
The Commission’s view is that personal data held by private 
companies in the EU should not, in principle, be directly accessed by 
or transferred to foreign enforcement authorities outside of formal 
channels of cooperation, such as for example the Mutual Legal 
Assistance treaties (MLATs). The Commission has brought this point 
                                                   
216 Letter from Viviane Reding to Sophie in ‘t Veld, Member of the European 
Parliament (24 June 2014), http://www.nu.nl/files/nutech/Scan-Ares-MEP-
in%27t-Veld-.pdf. 
217 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-
2014-010602+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
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to the attention of the US authorities on several occasions and is 
resolute to further insist on finding a solution to this question. 
EU institutions have also raised the issue of the “the need to clarify that 
personal data held by private entities in the territory of the other party will 
not be accessed by law enforcement agencies outside of legally authorized 
channels” in the context of EU-US discussions. In this sense, for instance, 
a Joint Press Statement following a EU-US Justice and Home Affairs 
Ministerial Meeting in Washington, D.C., in November 2013218 pointed out 
that during the meeting there had been “discussions” on that subject.  
In the Riga Statement219 on enhancing transatlantic cooperation in 
the area of justice, freedom and security of 3 June 2015 the EU and 
the US expressed their commitment to  
Enhance the implementation of the U.S.-EU Mutual Legal Assistance 
Agreement (including in relation to transmission of financial 
information), conclude its review as foreseen by the Agreement and 
conduct workshops (including through Eurojust) to discuss such 
issues with national competent authorities. 
The European Commission is indeed currently reviewing the MLA 
agreement. On that same occasion Commissioner Jourová emphasised:  
The European Commission has recently adopted the European 
Agenda on Security. It stresses the need for a criminal justice 
approach to fighting organised crime and terrorism covering 
investigation and prosecution, recruitment, training, and financing. 
The Agenda calls for reinforced criminal justice cooperation, both 
inside the EU and with our close partners, such as the United States. 
And this cooperation must take place in full respect of fundamental 
rights and values, including the protection of personal data. We 
therefore also discussed the need for effective data protection 
rules.220 
These high-level political commitments to the implementation of the EU-US 
MLA stand in contrast with developments and discussions taking place in 
                                                   
218 Joint Press Statement following a EU-US-Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial 
Meeting of 18 November 2013 in Washington, D.C., http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-1010_en.htm. 
219  Available at https://eu2015.lv/images/Kalendars/IeM/Riga_Statement_EU_ 
US_Ministers.pdf. See also https://eu2015.lv/news/media-releases/2003-eu-us-
justice-and-home-affairs-meeting-endorses-riga-statement-for-transatlantic-
cooperation-in-the-area-of-freedom-security-and-justice. 
220 European Commission, Speech, Press speaking points of Commissioner Jourová 
at the EU-US-Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Meeting in Riga, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5112_en.htm. See also 
European Commission, European Agenda on Security, COM(2015)185 final, 
28.4.2015, which states, “Mutual legal assistance (MLA) agreements with third 
countries (United States, Japan) are key instruments for international judicial 
cooperation, and the Commission will assess whether it is necessary to develop 
other bilateral or multilateral agreements with key third countries”, and “Eurojust 
can also be a great help for complex mutual legal assistance requests with 
countries outside the EU, especially with the network of the Eurojust contact 
points.” 
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the context of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention 
Committee (T-CY), which has been seen as an example of ‘venue 
shopping’. In a field of law where clear EU-level transnational rule-of-law 
standards exist, some EU Member States and security professionals are 
using these regional meetings to agree on new rules which would lower and 
even put at risk those standards by legalising unilateral and direct law 
enforcement access to data held by private sector actors under EU 
jurisdiction.  
The dilemmas posed by these discussions from the perspective of 
lawfulness has been pointed out by the European Parliament in 
relation to concerns on the work conducted by the Cybercrime Convention 
Committee (T-CY) of the Council of Europe on transborder access to data 
and the initiative to conclude a new additional Protocol to the Convention 
on the matter which would substantially amend the current Article 32.b of 
the Budapest Convention.  
The European Parliament’s Mass Surveillance Enquiry resulted in the 21 
February 2014 Moraes Report on the US NSA surveillance programme and 
surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU 
citizens’ fundamental rights and transatlantic cooperation on JHA.221 The 
Moraes Report stated in paragraph 32:  
Stresses its serious concerns in relation to the work within the 
Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Convention Committee on the 
interpretation of Article 32 of the Convention on Cybercrime of 23 
November 2001 on transborder access to stored computer data with 
consent or where publicly available, and opposes any conclusion of 
an additional protocol or guidance intended to broaden the scope of 
this provision beyond the current regime established by this 
Convention, which is already a major exception to the principle of 
territoriality because it could result in unfettered remote access 
by law enforcement authorities to servers and computers located in 
other jurisdictions without recourse to MLA agreements and other 
instruments of judicial cooperation put in place to guarantee the 
fundamental rights of the individual, including data 
protection and due process, and in particular Council of Europe 
Convention 108 [emphasis added]. 
In December, a Report adopted by the Council of Europe T-CY Committee 
acknowledged that the Moraes Report “includes strong criticism of the 
ongoing work of the T-CY on transborder access to data”. It also referred 
to the exchange of views at a mini-hearing organised by the Parliament’s 
LIBE Committee on 24 September 2014, where T-CY representatives 
presented their ongoing work, as “rather controversial”.222 During the mini-
hearing the compliance of the proposals from the perspective of EU law was 
highlighted by some MEPs. They expressed the lack of a proper legal 
                                                   
221  Refer to http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+ 
REPORT+A7-2014-0139+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
222  Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), Transborder 
access to data and jurisdiction: Options for further action by the T-CY, 3 December 
2014, Strasbourg, p. 10. 
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basis to negotiate such a protocol because the EU had already 
exercised legal competence in the field of cybercrime, exchange of 
information and data protection.  
A confidential opinion issued by the Parliament’s Legal Service concluded 
that223 while the work in the context of the Council of Europe is far from 
being complete and conclusive, the Union had exercised competence in 
these areas and that several pieces of EU law cover to a large extent the 
area dealt with by the Convention.224 It also underlined that a risk that 
common EU rules would be affected is not enough, and even if there is no 
possible contradiction between EU rules and other potential commitments 
EU Member States should refrain from entering into international 
commitments. The Parliament’s Legal Service concluded that the EU has 
external competence in the area forming the subject matter of the 
Budapest Convention. Therefore, any future negotiation should be 
the competence of the European Commission. 
4.3. Inefficiency?  
Arguments in favour of the operability or legalisation of remote/unmediated 
access to data controlled by companies under EU jurisdiction often refer to 
the inefficiency of the current MLA mediated model. The US 
government has expressed as one of its arguments in the Microsoft Search 
Warrant Case that MLA procedures would be lengthy and would not result 
in a prompt disclosure of the required data (see section 2.2.2 above). In 
the same vein, discussions in the framework of the Council of Europe 
Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) have made similar claims when 
concluding that MLA processes are “inefficient in general, and with respect 
to obtaining electronic evidence in particular”.225 
This section critically examines the extent to which arguments on the 
inefficiency are in fact well substantiated and justified on the basis 
of objective evidence. What are the main issues behind the obstacles 
characterising the operability and implementation of MLA channels for 
meditated access to data in foreign jurisdictions? Can it be concluded that 
MLAs are inefficient in general? Special attention is paid to available 
information regarding the operability of the EU-US MLA agreement (section 
4.3.1), and an assessment report on mutual legal assistance provisions 
conducted by the CoE Cybercrime Convention Committee (section 4.3.2). 
                                                   
223 European Parliament, Legal Service, Note: LIBE – Convention of the Council of 
Europe on Cybercrime (CTS 185) – European Union Competence, 29.1.2015. 
224 These include, inter alia, through the adoption of the Directive 2013/40/EU on 
attacks against information systems (OJ L 218, 14.8.2013), the Council Framework 
Decision 2006/960/JHA on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence 
between law enforcement authorities of EU Member States (OJ L 386, 29.12.2006), 
the Directive 2014/41 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal 
matters (OJ L 130, 1.5.2014) as well as the Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of 
police and judicial cooperation (OJ L 350, 30.12.2008). 
225 Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee T-CY, T-CY Assessment 
Report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime, 3 December 2014, Strasbourg. 
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section 4.3.3 outlines the actual issues which need to be taken into 
consideration when assessing the effectiveness of MLA mediated models of 
access to data. 
4.3.1. The EU-US MLA in Practice 
Publicly available information on the practical use and implementation of 
the EU-US MLA agreement is lacking. A questionnaire leaked by Statewatch 
provides detailed information on its application.226 The questionnaire was 
drafted in preparation for the workshop on the application of the MLA and 
extradition agreements between the European Union and the US organised 
by the EU Agency Eurojust (the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit) 
on 25-26 October 2012.227 It provides information on the application of the 
EU-US MLA between 1 February 2010 and 31 August 2012.  
What do the questionnaire responses tell us about the efficiency or 
inefficiency in the operability of the EU-US MLA, and the existence 
of practical obstacles and promising practices characterising the 
use of the MLA procedures in transatlantic relations?  
A majority of EU Member State authorities reported excellent 
cooperation in the application of MLAs with the US. From the 
statistical information provided in Table 2 below, Germany, Spain, Poland, 
the Netherlands and the UK are at the top of list of EU Member States 
issuing MLA Requests to the US.228 Finland, Cyprus, Denmark, Italy and 
Ireland underlined that the cooperation works very well and no 
legal/practical obstacles exist.229  
Table 2. Number of MLA requests issued by EU Member States to the US 
2010-12 
EU Member 
State 
MLA Requests Issued 
Austria - 
Belgium - 
Bulgaria 61 
Croatia - 
Cyprus 17 
Czech Republic 98 
Denmark 23 
Estonia 24 
Finland 23 
                                                   
226  See http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/nov/eu-council-eu-usa-mla-
requests-14253-rev2-12.pdf. 
227 Council of the EU, 14253/2/12, Brussels, 24 October 2012. 
228 Information on number of MLA requests received from the US is lacking. 
229 Only Hungary states that in a majority of the cases the US authorities do not 
accomplish their MLA requests. 
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France 148 (110 requests for international judicial assistance 
issued by courts and 38 requests for investigation from the 
public prosecutors’ offices) 
Germany 471 
Greece 171 
Hungary 53 
Ireland 79 
Italy  78 
Lithuania 80 (76 pre-trial and 4 in trial) 
Latvia 2 (trial stage) and 27 (pre-trial stage) 
Luxembourg 7 
Malta 7 
The Netherlands  274 
Poland 294 (8 trial stage and 286 in pre-trial) 
Portugal - 
Romania 37 (investigation phase on cybercrimes) and 29 
(investigation of other serious offences) 
 
100 in trial stage 
 
Slovakia 35 
Slovenia 51 
Spain 315 
Sweden 144 
UK 256 
Source: Council of the EU, 14253/2/12, Brussels, 24 October 2012. 
 
What have been the main practical obstacles reported by Member 
State authorities when cooperating with the US in the scope of the 
Agreement? The following can be highlighted: 
1. An informal application of a ‘proportionality test’. US authorities do 
not execute an MLA request if financial interest is under $5,000,230 or 
$10,000 in fraud causes.231 Cases US authorities consider the cases as ‘less 
serious’ (de minimis or ‘low priority’) or in which the patrimonial loss is 
‘minimal’ or “when the offence on which the request is based has not had 
serious consequences or the scope of the assistance sought is 
disproportionate in relation to the possible sentence imposed” 232  are 
                                                   
230 Answers by Bulgaria and Poland. 
231 Answer by Lithuania.  
232  Answers by Spain, Poland, Romania, Slovenia. The response by Greece 
underlined a similar issue. 
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sometimes rejected and not duly processed, even though such grounds for 
refusal are not laid down in the MLA.233  
2. A key legal obstacle underlined in the questionnaire responses is the US 
‘probable cause’ evidence requirement. This requires providing a 
detailed statement of facts without conclusions.234  
3. Some EU Member States alluded to obstacles based on US laws. A 
first issue relates to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which 
enshrines freedom of expression and prohibits the criminal prosecution of 
speech, where MLA requests are rarely successful. France reported such an 
obstacle in cases of ‘public defamation or public insult’.235 A second issue 
relates to obstacles when requesting a hearing of the accused or specific 
investigatory measures, such as taking victims’ statements.236  
4. Another practical issue underlined by the questionnaire responses was 
that the US does not have a minimum retention period of electronic 
data.237  
5. The length of time of the procedure was also referred to as another 
practical obstacle.238 This often relates to the need to translate the request, 
which has been reported to be critical in urgent cases such as those related 
to the freezing of a bank account.239 
                                                   
233 Lithuania stated that few MLA requests received no reaction by US authorities. 
234 The response by Spain stated, “The problem is that, in most cases, the request 
is sent to the US in a pre-trial investigation, and so the Spanish judge hasn’t still 
got very detailed information to provide”. The issue was raised by Germany, which 
reported, “[I]t is often impossible for German authorities to demonstrate a 
probable connection between the evidence to be seized and the underlying offence 
at the time confirmation is required”. German authorities highlighted that this is 
particularly the case in respect of email data, and stated, “German authorities have 
recently started approaching American providers directly with the express 
authorization of the US Department of Justice and with the aim of data being 
supplied on a voluntary basis”. The Spanish authorities also mentioned a similar 
obstacle in requests seeking “email content information”, where very detailed 
information needs to be provided by the judge. Lithuania, Sweden and the Czech 
Republic report a similar kind of obstacle related to the “probable cause” 
requirement. France also signalled a similar issue in respect of electronic data and 
requests for MLA aimed at obtaining content, and Luxembourg in cases of 
cybercrime. 
235 A similar issue was raised by the Czech Republic, Greece and Slovakia. 
236 Responses by Romania, Sweden, Slovenia and Slovakia. Sweden also reports, 
“[W]hen an investigation is on-going in both countries, it seems to be difficult to 
receive information from US authorities that may be used in Swedish 
investigation”. 
237 France emphasised data retention rules depend on each US company and 
foreign judicial authorities lack a clear overview of these time periods. France also 
declared, “US companies require a minimum of factual material concerning the 
ongoing investigation, which can pose problems for the French authorities because 
of the principle of investigation secrecy in French law”. Other countries, such as 
Lithuania, also mention the limited time of data retention as an obstacle. 
238 Answers by Malta, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
239 Answer by the Czech Republic. 
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Despite these practical obstacles, several EU Member State authorities 
emphasised that legal or practical obstacles are usually overcome 
through bilateral case consultations and daily contacts between 
central authorities.240 They were said to be solved/dealt with informally and 
via direct contact with US authorities.241  
In light of the above, one can conclude that the questionnaire providing 
information on the application of the EU-US MLA between 1 February 2010 
and 31 August 2012 showed that a majority of EU Member State authorities 
reported excellent cooperation in the application of MLAs with the US. While 
several practical obstacles have been highlighted, there is no evidence 
substantiating the argument that the EU-US MLA is ineffective, 
which would properly justify bypassing its application. 
4.3.2. The Assessment by the Cybercrime Convention Committee 
A similar finding can be concluded when looking at the results of an 
assessment of MLAs conducted by the Council of Europe Cybercrime 
Convention Committee T-CY.242 The T-CY concluded, “The mutual legal 
assistance (MLA) process is considered inefficient in general, and with 
respect to obtaining electronic evidence in particular”.243 It added:  
Replies suggest that MLA is considered too complex, lengthy and 
resource-intensive to obtain electronic evidence, and thus often not 
pursued. Law enforcement authorities tend to attempt to obtain 
information through police-to-police cooperation to avoid MLA, even 
though the information thus obtained in most cases cannot be used 
in criminal proceedings.244  
                                                   
240 E.g. the Czech Republic, Romania and the Netherlands. 
241 Answers by Denmark and Lithuania. This was also mentioned in the reply from 
French authorities, which states that “almost daily contact” between the relevant 
authorities means that “any problems likely to arise…can be anticipated or resolved 
in the context of what are often constructive exchanges”. Malta reported that the 
time period to execute a request improved considerably given “the direct contact” 
with the U.S. Department of Justice. The UK stated that in each country there is a 
“Liaison Prosecutor/Legal Attaché who are responsible for facilitating the provision 
of MLA between the two countries”, and that the UK Liaison Prosecutor had issued 
a guide to obtaining email/Internet data from the US which is used by UK 
prosecutors when drafting MLA requests and guarantees compliance with US law. 
242 Council of Europe, Cybercrime Convention Committee T-CY, T-CY Assessment 
Report: The mutual legal assistance provisions of the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime, 3 December 2014, Strasbourg.  
243  Council of Europe (2015), Criminal Justice Access to Data in the Cloud: 
Challenges, Discussion Paper prepared by the T-CY Cloud Evidence Group, 26 May 
2015, Strasbourg, p. 11. It argues, “The mutual legal assistance (MLA) process is 
considered inefficient in general, and with respect to obtaining electronic evidence 
in particular. Response times to requests of six to 24 months appear to be the 
norm. Many requests and thus investigations are abandoned. This adversely affects 
the positive obligation of governments to protect society and individuals against 
cybercrime and other crime involving electronic evidence.” 
244 It is also stated that “police-to-police cooperation for the sharing of data related 
to cybercrime and e-evidence is much more frequent than mutual legal assistance 
(the ratio seems to range from 10:1 to 50:1)”. The assessment report concludes, 
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The assessment is based on answers/inputs to a questionnaire received 
between April 2013 and November 2014 by Council of Europe members. 
Not all EU Member States replied to the questionnaire. A key finding of the 
assessment is that most States were not able to provide specific statistics 
on ‘the frequency’ of MLA to stored computer data. The reasons identified 
for this were the increasingly decentralised MLA process, where requests 
are sent directly between relevant ‘judicial authorities’ and not only via the 
central authorities,245 and that no separate statistics are kept for requests 
on electronic data. 
The argument of ‘ineffectiveness’ developed in the T-CY assessment 
suffers, however, from a number of unanswered questions. The 
assessment provides no clear evidence that practical obstacles in the 
operability of MLAs justify concluding that the mediated model of access to 
data lacks efficiency. Neither is it clear how current practical hurdles can 
back up the argument that an “MLA is not always a realistic solution to 
access evidence in the loud context”.246 The question of lack of effectiveness 
is first challenged when looking at the level of frequency of use that the 
Discussion Paper and the assessment assume. They do not take duly into 
account the reasons why some of the MLA requests may be actually refused, 
which often have to do with procedures necessary to delivering justice 
between two jurisdictions.  
In fact, and similar to the results of the Eurojust questionnaire on the EU-
US MLA analysed in section 4.3.1 above, the CoE assessment points out a 
number of legal grounds which are often referred to when MLA requests are 
rejected. In particular, those referring to ‘time’ and the referred ‘delays’ (6-
24 months) are often related to the lack of ‘mutual recognition’ between 
the jurisdictions at hand, the existence of ‘informal grounds of refusal’ (e.g. 
proportionality, ne bis in idem, etc.) or specificities of the legal systems at 
hand.247  
Also surprising is the assessment’s conclusion that one of the key reasons 
affecting the effectiveness of existing MLA frameworks is that “the Parties 
appear not to make full use of the opportunities offered by the Budapest 
Convention on Cybercrime and other agreements for the purpose of 
effective mutual legal assistance related to cybercrime and electronic 
evidence”. Therefore, is the MLA system inefficient or rather do the answers 
to the questionnaire show the lack of willingness of relevant authorities to 
                                                   
“[T]he MLA process is considered inefficient in general, and with respect to 
obtaining electronic evidence in particular”. See p. 123. 
245 It is said that “[m]ultiple offices may be involved in the sending or receiving of 
requests and in particular the execution of requests”, p. 6. 
246 Ibid. 
247 See pp. 33-34 of the assessment. These are issues which come very clearly 
from the findings highlighted in the T-CY assessment which, when addressing 
problems encountered in respect of “procedure for sending/receiving requests”, 
highlights the following issues in respect of the US: request may not meet the legal 
threshold or formal requirements of the requested State or request not complete 
or threshold/standard required too high; inadequacy of the laws to permit countries 
to assist others; ‘probable cause’ requirement. Pp. 38-39. 
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make proper and effective use of the existing criminal justice cooperation 
tools?  
4.3.3. Addressing Efficiency  
Within the scope of the EU-US MLA, the responses to the Eurojust 
questionnaire are clear: The legal and practical obstacles which were 
reported have been said to be overcome through direct and daily 
contacts/communications between relevant authorities, in particular in 
relation to addressing the challenge of the duration of the 
procedure.  
Issues such as lack of adequate staffing and financial resources may 
be in this respect critical. While there might be important obstacles and 
barriers affecting the use of MLA processes, these can be overcome by 
bilateral case consultations, day-to-day contacts, stronger political 
commitments by all the parties involved on their uses and proper financial, 
technological and human resources investment in their implementation. 
Pressures are mounting in the US to effectively address some of the current 
obstacles by increasing funding for US MLA processes.248 Improving MLA 
technologies, including digital certification, transmission, intake and 
processing249 has been suggested as a key way forward in contributing to 
increasing the efficiency of current procedures. 
The unilateral use of ‘unmediated models’ of access to data by any of 
the parties involved profoundly endangers the trust placed in these 
day-to-day working relationships which have until present overcome 
practical obstacles. As highlighted in section 3.2 above, when studying the 
EU-US MLA, the scope of many of its provisions and exceptions is already 
very broad in nature. This is the case in respect of privacy and data 
protection standards in the Agreement, which are largely weak and 
subject to wide-ranging exceptions. It would be therefore difficult to argue 
that they constitute insurmountable barriers to criminal justice cooperation. 
A key finding coming out of the questionnaire’s responses and which raises 
a number of concerns relates to the lack of a general picture of practices 
regarding grounds of refusal by US authorities and EU Member States, or 
informal procedures or channels agreed between each EU Member State 
and the Department of Justice in respect of electronic data and cooperation 
with private sector.250  
                                                   
248 http://www.itic.org/dotAsset/3/f/3f626c7e-f34d-42d6-a86b-4cf61b02ef3c.pdf. 
The Department’s FY 2015 Budget has requested an additional $24.1 million for 
significantly increasing the personnel dedicated to reviewing and executing MLAT 
requests as well as technological enhancements to vastly improve the way requests 
are prioritised, analysed and categorised. See 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/jmd/legacy/2014/07/13/mut-legal-assist.pdf. 
249 A. K. Woods (2015), “Data Beyond Borders: Mutual Legal Assistance in the 
Internet Age”, Global Network Initiative. 
250 On the importance of information gathered in an ‘informal’ manner, see T. 
Markus Funk (2014), “Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Letters Rogatory: A 
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This relates to the lack of a permanent/systematic and independent 
system evaluating the operability and application of the EU-US MLA, 
as well as the set of bilateral agreements. There is neither a systematic 
statistical gathering on the actual number of MLA requests issued and 
received by EU Member States and the US, which adds to the obscurity and 
lack of transparency and accountability of the current EU-US MLA 
frameworks.  
A key challenge of the current MLA model is not its lack of efficiency, but 
rather the difficulty of ensuring consistency of bilateral 
agreements/practices with general/umbrella agreement principles/rules, as 
well as with informal practices which have developed during the last five 
years as regards grounds for refusal or kinds of cooperation on questions 
related to evidence and investigations. To this we may add the challenge of 
ensuring compliance with the set of EU legal standards studies in section 3 
above in a post-Lisbon Treaty landscape.  
The question of ‘effectiveness’ very much depends on ‘whose 
perspective’ the question is raised. From the perspective of ‘delivery of 
justice’ by an independent court of law, rapidity or speed is 
counterproductive to the rule of law. It is no surprise that police-to-police 
cooperation is faster, as the rule-of-law test is absent. 
4.4. Privacy and Data Protection  
A key challenge posed by US authorities’ access to data under EU 
jurisdiction is its incompatibility with EU data protection acquis, and 
more specifically the ways in which it challenges the European 
understanding or notion of ‘privacy’ as developed by the ECtHR and 
now also enshrined in Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Safeguarding European rights against unlawful access and misuse of data 
in the transatlantic context requires taking into account the discrepancies 
between the EU and the US regimes. 
EU institutions and Member States have the obligation to ensure the 
safeguarding of EU fundamental rights in any operating framework of 
transnational cooperation in the domains of law enforcement and criminal 
justice, including (but not limited to) privacy and data protection. In the EU 
legal system fundamental rights are not exclusively enjoyed by EU citizens 
or residents, but more generally by all natural persons. For instance, 
Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter refer to “Anyone”, and therefore do not 
delimit the personal scope of application to EU citizens or nationals of EU 
Member States.  
It is therefore necessary for the EU to ensure that any framework of 
international cooperation, and its implementation, ensures the protection 
of the rights of EU citizens as well as any other person whose data 
and rights must nevertheless be protected under EU law. 251 
                                                   
Guide for Judges”, Federal Judicial Centre, International Litigation Guide, pp. 1 and 
23. 
251 The inclusion in the proposed General Data Protection Regulation of criteria 
delimiting its scope of application related to the place of residence of data subjects 
does not alter the basic principle derived from EU fundamental rights. Furthermore, 
the general reach of the EU personal data protection acquis has been already 
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Significant inconsistencies exist between the EU and US regimes in relation 
to personal data protection. The US legal system and surveillance 
practices place non-US residents in a particularly weak position, 
unlike that which is generally enjoyed by US residents. This structural 
vulnerability of non-residents in the US legal system cannot be easily 
solved.  
The U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment does not protect all people, but 
only the individuals who have established a voluntary connection to the US 
as a sovereign.252 In addition, the Fourth Amendment provides almost no 
protection for data stored by third parties, even though requesting data of 
third parties is, precisely, the way in which EU law enforcement authorities 
typically pursue accessing data by non-US citizens.253 As it has been studied 
in section 3.2 above, the negotiations of the EU-US data protection umbrella 
agreement depend on progress on securing EU citizens who are not 
resident in the US the right to effective judicial redress if their data 
has been mishandled. This issue remains open.254 
There is room for these discrepancies to be reduced in the future. Following 
the 2013 Snowden revelations there have been recent signs hinting towards 
a general reinforcement of privacy protection in the US. The U.S. 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board severely criticised governmental 
                                                   
explicitly inscribed in some EU-US legal instruments. The 2010 EU-US TFTP 
Agreement, for instance, describes a series of “Safeguards applicable to the 
processing of Provided Data” that are to be provided by the U.S. Treasury 
Department “without discrimination, in particular on the basis of nationality or 
country of residence”. See Article 5(1) of the EU-US TFTP Agreement. 
252 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). See also, on this 
subject, O. S. Kerr (2010), “The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet”, 
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 4, p. 288. 
253 In United States v. Miller (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court held indeed that there 
is no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding information held by a third party. 
425 U.S. 435. In Smith v. Maryland (1979), this ‘third party doctrine’ was further 
reinforced as the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
transactional information associated with making phone calls. Foreign (non-US) 
individuals are also particularly targeted through the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). Pub. L. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1783, 50 U.S.C. ch. 36. 
FISA authorises the interception of real time communications when there is 
‘probable cause’ to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign 
power or agent of a foreign power, and each of the facilities or places at which 
electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used by a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power. 
254 Additionally, in January 2014, U.S. President Obama signed Presidential Policy 
Directive 28 on Signals Intelligence Activities, and delivered an address at the 
Department of Justice on the steps to reform certain intelligence activities. Section 
4 of Presidential Policy Directive 28 requires the intelligence community to establish 
policies and procedures for safeguarding personal information collected during 
intelligence activities. The section emphasises, “All persons should be treated with 
dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, 
and all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal 
information”. The White House, Presidential Policy Directive 28, 17 January 2014, 
p. 5. 
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bulk collection of data,255 in what can be described as an echo of the findings 
of the CJEU in the 2014 Digital Rights Ireland case.256 The U.S. Freedom 
Act was enacted on June 2 2015, imposing a series of limits on the bulk 
collection of telecommunication metadata on US citizens by US agencies 
such as the National Security Agency.  
That notwithstanding, the CJEU ruling Digital Rights Ireland (Joined 
Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12) on data retention (section 3.2.2.3) has 
much broader legal consequences than merely the invalidation of the 
EU Data Retention Directive. The Court’s reasoning is relevant across the 
board and the findings are also of particular significance when assessing 
the lawfulness of the various transatlantic agreements on data exchange 
and processing.  
One of the key arguments used by the CJEU for annulling the Directive at 
issue was that the amount and precision of the data covered by this 
instrument allowed for very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning 
private lives: everyday habits, permanent and temporary residences, where 
people go, who they meet and places they visit; therefore generating a 
vague feeling in the public of constant surveillance.257 The Court held that 
this allowed States to access all this information directly and this profoundly 
affected the private lives of everyone in the EU. It concluded that the 
system introduced by the Data Retention Directive constituted a particularly 
serious interference with the broader right of privacy enshrined in Article 7 
EU Charter. 
As the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) stated in a Press 
Statement following the publication of the ruling by the Luxembourg 
Court,258 “The judgment also means that the EU should take a firm position 
in discussions with third countries, particularly the US on the access and 
use of communications data of EU residents.” Indeed, remote unmediated 
access to electronic data under EU jurisdiction brings about further 
mistrust in wider EU-US relations. How can the benchmarks developed 
by the CJEU in this ruling be respected in transatlantic relations in a context 
where access to data outside existing legal channels is proliferating? 
                                                   
255 Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, Report on the Telephone Records 
Program Conducted Under section 215 of the U.S. Patriot Act and on the Operations 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (23 January 2014). 
256 See V. Mitsilegas (2015), “The Transformation of Privacy in an Era of Pre-
emptive Surveillance”, Tilburg Law Review, 20, pp. 35-57.  
257 The CJEU held, “[T]he fact that data are retained and subsequently used without 
the subscriber or registered user being informed is likely to generate in the minds 
of the persons concerned the feeling that their private lives are the subject of 
constant surveillance”, para. 37 of the judgment.  
258  Refer to 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/ 
Documents/EDPS/PressNews/Press/2014/14-04-08_Press_statement_DRD_EN. 
pdf. 
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SECTION 5. WAYS FORWARD:  
SCENARIOS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
here are several scenarios when dealing with the legal and rule-of-law 
challenges inherent to third-country access to data for law 
enforcement and criminal justice purposes, in particular in the context 
of the EU-US MLA agreements. Three main options can be envisaged. They 
all share as a cross-cutting principle the prevalence of a mediated access 
model to data, which as examined in section 4 of this study is a pre-
condition for fundamental rights and rule of law to be duly safeguarded.  
5.1. Option 1. Enhancing the MLA agreement model 
A first possibility would be to focus all efforts on ways to enhance existing 
legal provisions and procedures envisaged in the EU-US MLA framework 
within the current framework and without needing any general or specific 
legislative reform.  
This option should take as a first step the establishment of an objective 
and independent evaluation system of the current practical 
implementation and operability of the transatlantic MLA system, which 
should be in turn subject to proper democratic and legal accountability. 
Such a system would accurately identify the main barriers and deficits 
characterising the EU-US MLA model. A key finding of this study is that such 
an evaluation or tracking method does not currently exist. There is not any 
publicly available statistical information on the frequency, quantitative uses 
and scope of MLA requests between the EU and the US.  
This ‘knowledge gap’ poses serious obstacles for guaranteeing proper 
scrutiny and transparency in a policy domain (judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters and police) where the EU is now sharing competence with 
EU Member States. It also increased the difficulty for conducting a 
‘consistency check’ between EU Member States’ bilateral MLA agreements 
and practices with the US on the gathering and exchange of evidence, and 
the model and common rules laid down in the EU-US MLA Agreement.  
The result of such a system could lead to the elaboration by the European 
Commission and Eurojust, in close collaboration with the European 
Parliament, as well as relevant US authorities, of an EU-US Guide for 
practitioners on the use and procedures in the EU-US MLA. The focus 
of such a Guide would be in providing ‘promising practices’ to relevant 
national authorities for overcoming practical obstacles and ensuring some 
streamlining of procedures. Particular attention could be paid to the 
application and practical understandings of the main grounds for refusal of 
assistance in MLA requests envisaged by the Agreement, including 
questions of relevant national and European laws as well as the 
proportionality and fundamental rights tests. The ways in which 
T
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technologies and an online submission form could facilitate the daily 
operability of requests should be also explored.259 
The EU Guide could also provide guidelines and common standards for 
ensuring more transparency of the process and the clarity in the 
procedures, including a uniform tracking system for the follow-up and 
update of the state of affairs and time-frame of EU-US MLA requests. 
Eurojust could also play a more active role in supporting and facilitating the 
execution of MLA requests between the EU and the US.260 This should take 
place under close democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament, judicial 
control by the CJEU and relevant EU data protection bodies such as the 
European Data Protection Supervisor, Article 29 Working Party and the 
European Agency on Fundamental Rights (FRA). 
Bilateral consultations and daily contacts between designated central 
authorities on both sides of the Atlantic has proved to be efficient when 
addressing and overcoming current obstacles affecting MLA processes. 
These should go hand-to-hand with stronger political commitments by 
all the parties involved, and corresponding judicial/law enforcement 
practices in line with those, on the usefulness and value of existing legal 
channels and MLA instruments for transatlantic cooperation in the gathering 
of and access to evidence. 
Unmediated access to electronic data under foreign jurisdiction is not only 
an issue of USA authorities. EU Member States should refrain from similar 
                                                   
259 The creation of an online submission form for MLAs was recommended by the 
U.S. President’s Review Group Report “Liberty and Security in a Changing World: 
Report and Recommendations”, 12 December 2013. The Report states that 
“[t]oday, there is no online form for foreign governments that seek to use the MLAT 
process. An online submission process, accompanied by clear information to foreign 
governments about the MLAT requirements, would make it easier for distant and 
diverse foreign governments to understand what is required under the US probable 
cause standard or other laws.” 
260 This has been the case in a rather limited way in the past. This has included 
Eurojust requesting third States to speed up or facilitate the execution of 
extradition and MLA requests between Eurojust national desks and liaison 
prosecutors. Practical examples have included, e.g. execution of freezing and 
confiscation orders, hearings by videoconference, interception of communications, 
transfer of criminal proceedings, requests for criminal records, clarifying legal 
requirements and relevant legislation or identifying contact details of competent 
authorities. See Eurojust 2012 Annual Report (2013), Council 8179/13, 8 April 
2013, which reads, “Eurojust’s assistance was requested by the Italian authorities 
to facilitate the execution of MLA requests addressed to the competent authorities 
in the US and Portugal to acquire all the relevant information and documentation 
proving the fictitious nature of both subsidiaries. Thanks to Eurojust’s speedy 
intervention, a quick response from the Portuguese authorities to the Italian MLA 
request was obtained, which resulted in the full payment of tax liabilities of the 
investigated Italian company within the time limits of the Italian preliminary 
investigation. The immediate reaction of Eurojust and the Portuguese authorities 
enabled the Italian authorities to recover EUR 67 million in unpaid taxes” (p. 56). 
See also Eurojust 2013 Annual Report (2014), p. 44. Eurojust provided assistance 
in 23 cases related to the US in 2013 and 18 in 2014. See a case illustration at 
http://eurojust.europa.eu/doclibrary/corporate/eurojust%20Annual%20Reports/
Annual%20Report%202014/Annual-Report-2014-EN.pdf (p 47). 
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practices as they contravene EU law. Moreover, EU Member States and 
regional bodies (such as those in the context of the Council of Europe) 
should refrain from ‘venue or forum shopping’ practices seeking to amend, 
lower or renegotiate existing EU legal instruments and standards on mutual 
legal assistance and criminal justice cooperation. These are domains where 
the EU has exercised wide legal competence in recent decades and where 
clear and proper Union standards already exist, including (but not limited 
to) the EU-US MLA and the EIO.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1.1. The EU should set up an independent and objective evaluation 
system on the operability of EU-US MLA agreements, including statistical 
coverage of quantitative uses and frequency of use. An EU-US Guide for 
Practitioners on the Use and Procedures within the EU-US MLA 
Agreement should be adopted. 
5.1.2. Eurojust could further facilitate cooperation between EU Member 
States and the US authorities in the execution of MLA requests, under 
close democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament, judicial control by 
the CJEU and relevant EU data protection bodies such as the European 
Data Protection Supervisor, Article 29 Working Party and the European 
Agency on Fundamental Rights (FRA). 
5.1.3. All relevant Directorate Generals of the European Commission 
should more clearly express that current EU legal and rule-of-law 
standards on the gathering of data for law enforcement and criminal 
justice purposes should be fully respected and complied with in all open 
venues of cooperation with the US.  
5.1.4. The Commission should also express concerns and block any 
further discussion on transborder access to data in the Council of Europe 
Cybercrime Committee (T-CY). Issues related to data protection, criminal 
justice and cybercrime fall now under EU competence and any 
international negotiations covering these matters fall under exclusive EU 
external competence, with the Commission now being in the driver’s seat 
together with the European Parliament.  
5.1.5. The European Parliament should reiterate its concerns on the T-
CY’s work and oppose any conclusion of an additional protocol to the 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime which would legalise direct remote 
access to data held by private companies under EU jurisdiction. 
5.1.6. Key priorities and pre-conditions for further cooperation should be 
the swift conclusion of the EU-US umbrella agreement (including the 
granting to EU citizens of protection in US jurisdiction), as well as the EU 
inter-institutional adoption of the data protection package. 
 
5.2. Option 2. Improving the MLA agreement model – 
Legislative reform 
A second option would entail revising the current EU-US MLA framework 
through legislative reforms. This scenario would focus on bringing the EU-
US MLA agreement frameworks in line with the EU post-Lisbon Treaty 
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setting. As examined in this study, the set of EU legal instruments and 
standards have been profoundly reformed and fine-tuned since the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009.  
The EU now has express legal competence concerning questions related to 
criminal justice and police cooperation, and ensures proper and timely 
enforcement of EU laws covering these domains in EU Member States. This 
has come with the official recognition of the European Parliament’s role as 
‘co-legislator’ in these areas.  
A first key result of this new institutional setting has been the adoption of 
the EIO, which provides benchmarks for future internal and 
external EU action in the domain of criminal justice. These 
benchmarks include clear limits and parameters for the operation of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters between participating EU Member States. 
They cover, in particular, safeguards on the basis of domestic and 
constitutional provisions in the executing and issuing Member State, 
proportionality test and fundamental rights exceptions, in addition to the 
judicialisation of mutual legal assistance. 
The EU-US MLA Agreement could be revised in order to closely align its 
current rules to post-Lisbon EU legal standards on criminal justice and 
privacy. This would entail reopening negotiations between the EU and the 
US on these issues. While there could be some risks in reopening the 
agreement and lowering existing standards, EU Member States are now 
duty-bound to comply with the benchmarks laid down in the EIO and the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, including in their bilateral dealings with 
third countries or in regional venues such as the CoE.  
If this option moves forward, the Union’s responsibility would be to ensure 
that these standards function as the minimum foundations (red lines) for a 
new agreement to be concluded. Moreover, the EU should further ensure 
that all existing and future legal standards covering criminal justice 
cooperation are properly evaluated and codified in order to ensure a 
consistent application of EU criminal law across the EU and 
strengthen the legitimacy (and prevent further fragmentation) of 
the common EU Justice Area. 
Any future legislative reform of the EU-US MLA model should not implement 
a ‘mediator’ system following a ‘hybrid access to data model’ similar to the 
one existing in the domain of European financial transactions with Europol. 
Eurojust should not be entrusted with a similar role, because this would 
pose fundamental accountability and transparency challenges with 
profound negative repercussions for the EU fundamental rights of the 
defence and to a fair trial. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.2.1. The EU-US MLA model could be revised and amended in light of 
the EU post-Lisbon Treaty framework of legal standards and benchmarks 
in the domains of criminal justice and data protection. 
5.2.2. The EIO provides a set of common legal benchmarks for EU 
internal and external action in the field of European criminal justice 
cooperation which could be used as the minimum criteria or red lines for 
any future revision of the EU-US MLA framework. 
5.2.3. The European Commission and the European Parliament should 
better ensure consistent participation by all EU Member States in both 
enforcement and suspect rights measures in order to avoid incoherency 
and practical inoperability of the European Criminal Justice Area. 
5.2.4. Eurojust should not become a ‘mediator’ allowing for a hybrid 
access to data model which would circumvent EU Member States 
centralised authorities’ consent and independent review by relevant 
independent judicial authorities.  
5.2.5. The EU should call for the consolidation and even codification of 
existing EU rules and instruments dealing with judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, which could lead to the adoption of a Common Corpus 
of European Criminal Law laying down all EU legal standards in criminal 
justice cooperation, including those in cooperation with third countries.261 
This should go hand-to-hand with an effective and independent 
evaluation mechanism on the functioning of the EU criminal justice 
cooperation.262 
 
5.3. Option 3: Towards a transatlantic investigation order – 
Mutual recognition across the Atlantic? 
A third and by far more ambitious long-term scenario would be the 
development of a common justice area across the Atlantic. This would 
entail transferring and exporting the EU principle of mutual recognition in 
criminal justice cooperation in the Union’s relation with the US. Such a 
model should aim at ensuring a reinvigorated and revamped system of 
                                                   
261 As proposed in V. Mitsilegas et al. (2014), “The End of the Transitional Period 
for Police and Criminal Justice Measures Adopted before the Lisbon Treaty: Who 
Monitors Trust in the European Justice Area?”, CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe 
Series, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
262 See Article 70 of the TFEU, which reads, “[T]he Council may, on a proposal from 
the European Commission, adopt measures laying down the arrangements 
whereby Member States, in collaboration with the Commission, conduct objective 
and independent evaluation of the implementation of Union policies…in particular 
in order to facilitate the application of the principle of mutual recognition”. Refer to 
the European Parliament Resolution of 27 February 2014 with recommendations to 
the Commission on the review of the European Arrest Warrant (2013/2109(INL)). 
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cooperation for the purposes of law enforcement in the context of criminal 
justice investigations.  
This scenario would lead to the adoption of a Transatlantic Investigation 
Order (TIO) system seeking primarily to speed up and make more 
efficient cooperation between US and EU authorities in the field of criminal 
justice. The TIO would take the ‘benchmarks’ currently existing in the EIO 
as the core basis for cooperation. A system of such a nature would require 
close judicial scrutiny by the Court of Justice of the EU. 
It would also institutionalise EU-US mutual trust, while formalising the 
scope and use of grounds for refusing to give data to a requesting 
State. These would include the application of exceptions on grounds of 
proportionality, fundamental rights and legality tests. This should go hand-
to-hand with submitting the TIO system to existing EU legal standards on 
privacy and criminal justice procedural rights of suspects. 
RECOMMENDATION  
5.3.1. The EU and the US could in the future explore the possibility of 
establishing mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal justice which 
have been issued/validated by an independent judicial authority to gather 
evidence in a State party. The EIO could be used as a model for a 
Transatlantic Investigation Order (TIO). 
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by private companies for purposes of law-enforcement investigations in criminal proceedings. 
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particular outside Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) treaties. The EU concluded an MLA agreement 
with the United States in 2003, which sets out the rules and procedures for lawful and legitimate 
access to evidence. A key distinguishing feature of the MLA-led process is that any request for 
access to data is ‘mediated’ by or requires the consent of the state authority to whom the request 
is submitted as well as scrutiny by an independent judicial authority.
Special focus is given in this study to the practical issues emerging in EU-US relations covering 
mutual legal assistance and evidence-gathering for law enforcement purposes in criminal 
proceedings. The fundamental question guiding this enquiry is: How best to ensure that the rule 
of law and trust-based methods are respected in these proceedings?
In conducting this study, the authors carried out a detailed survey of the main EU legal instruments 
and their standards, underlining their direct relevance for assessing the lawfulness and legitimacy 
of access to data. They then outline three possible scenarios for the future and put forward a set 
of policy recommendations for addressing these challenges. 
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